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INTRODUCTION
Negotiating free trade agreements is the political equivalent of
a trip to the dentist. Changing intellectual property laws is dental
work without anesthesia. It takes a great deal of persuasion for any
country to make a single change, let alone a multitude of changes.
Based on my experiences in 1997 and 1998, a stronger case needs
to be made for negotiating a high and consistent level of protection
for intellectual property rights in the Free Trade Area of the
Americas ("FTAA").' This Article represents an attempt to make
such a case to an informed and interested general audience.
In 1997 and 1998, I attended the Business Forum sessions,
which have met just before the annual hemispheric trade ministers'
summit to discuss the progress towards FTAA negotiations. The
forums were held respectively in Belo Horizonte, Brazil,2 and San
Jose, Costa Rica.3 I participated in the sessions of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property. Watching the discussions would
have led anyone to suspect that the intellectual property rights
1. The Heads of State of thirty-four democracies in the Western Hemisphere at the
Summit of the Americas agreed to construct a "Free Trade of the Americas " ("FTAA")
in an effort to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in the region. The resolution to con-
struct the FTAA was a result of the Summit of the Americas' desire to eliminate barriers
to trade and investment and advance economic integration and free trade. See Summit of
the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M.
808 (1995).
2. Third Trade Ministerial and Business Forum of the Americas, Belo Horizonte,
Brazil, May 13-16, 1998.
3. Fourth Trade Ministerial and Americas Business Forum, San Jose, Costa Rica,
Mar. 16-19, 1998.
4. The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, one of the 12 FTAA Work-
ing Groups established by the Trade Ministers was created at the March 1996 ministerial
in Cartagena, Columbia.
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("IPR") to be negotiated in the FTAA might not advance beyond
the current international standard found in the 1994 agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"),'
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks establishing
the World Trade Organization ("WTO").6
I argued as much in an article for the America's Column of the
Wall Street Journal under the demure headline, "Pirates Plunder
Patents. Will the Rule of Law Prevail?"7 In response to the piece,
James Packard Love8 and I have had several public and private de-
bates. Mr. Love works for Ralph Nader9 at the Center for Study of
Responsive Law,'0 and had also attended the Business Forum ses-
sions." Mr. Love supports the use of patents in developed coun-
tries; but, at the same time, he suggests that they could be optional
for developing countries. To that end, Mr. Love has proposed
forms of compulsory licensing 2 in which the effects would be off-
set by a scheme to replicate the incentive-to-invent with govern-
ment subsidies for research and development. 3
Our debate has mirrored the ongoing North-South discussion
on IPR and trade.14 The existence of our debate raises the question
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
6. The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations established the WTO. See
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions ("Uruguay Round"), Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
7. See Owen Lippert, Pirates Plunder Patents. Will the Rule of Law Prevail?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1998, at A15.
8. James Packard Love is a economist lawyer working at the Center for Study of
Responsive Law ("CSRL") in Washington, D.C.
9. Ralph Nader is a leading consumer advocate and the founder of several organiza-
tions, including the CSRL.
10. The CSRL was created by Ralph Nader in 1968 as an independent research and
advocacy organization that advances the interests of consumers and citizens on a wide
range of topics. The CSRL is based in Washington, D.C.
11. See Lippert, supra note 7.
12. See James Packard Love, A Free Trade Area For the Americas: A Consumer
Perspective on Proposals As They Relate To Rules Regarding Intellectual Property, (vis-
ited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.cptech.org./pharmi/belopaper.html>. This piece includes
comments presented for the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights at the Third
Ministerial and Americas Business Forum, Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
13. See id.
14. For a discussion of the North-South Debate, see Carlos A. Primo Braga, The
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that if the benefits of stronger IPR are so self-evident, why does it
take international treaties to prod developing nations into compli-
ance? The question can be restated in the context of the current
thirty-four nation effort to negotiate IPR in the FTAA.'" Are
American trade negotiators acting largely for the benefit of the
American pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industries
and are they using the FTAA to advance, in a more manageable
regional forum, those IPR standards which were not secured in
TRIPs? Are they seeking an accelerated implementation of TRIPs
and possibly a TRIPs Plus in key hemispheric markets? If so, is
this a desirable strategy for either or both the United States and the
developing Latin American countries?
These questions arise against a background of persistent aca-
demic skepticism as to the wisdom of negotiating IPR standards in
multilateral trade negotiations. 16 Reflective of that analysis is a
1993 article by J.H. Reichman, which he refutes the following
three propositions that, underlie the effort of developed nations to
strengthen IPR in multilateral negotiations. 7 First, "[s]trong intel-
lectual property rights exert an unreservedly positive influence on
developed free-market economies."' 8 Second, "[s]trong intellectual
property rights benefit all countries regardless of their present
stage of development."' 19 Last, "[t]he acquisition of non-indigenous
technologies by developing countries other than by imports or li-
cense usually constitutes an illicit economic loss to the technology
exporting countries."2 °
Reichman dismisses the first two propositions as "counter-
intuitive and neither historical experience nor the literature support
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. For articles laying out some of these concerns, see Keith E. Maskus, & M. Pe-
nubarti, How Trade-Related are Intellectual Property Rights? 39 J. INT'L. ECON. 227-48
(1995); see also Alan V. Deardoff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Devel-
oping Countries, 13 WORLD EON. 497-521 (1990).
17. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 173 (1993).
18. Id. at 173.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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them."'" Though he concedes that countries with established IPR
regimes are better off with them,22 Reichman questions whether
23
stronger regimes are necessarily more efficient than weaker ones.
He describes the third proposition as "this residual mercantilist at-
titude [which] conflicts with the underlying competitive ethos from
which intellectual property rights derogate and with the territorial
nature of these derogations."24 Under this view, the negotiation of
IPR in the FTAA is just another exercise of raw economic power
rather than a principled step towards an optimal regime. As in the
Uruguay Round, where trade access to developed nation markets
was horse-traded for the developing world's agreement to TRIPs,
the FTAA round proposes a similar deal in which the elimination
of hemispheric tariffs will be exchanged for a regional "TRIPs
Plus."
In response to Mr. Love, Professor Reichman, and others, this
Article seeks to answer the following three questions.
(1) Should a higher than TRIPs standard of IPR protection
be negotiated in the FTAA?
(2) If higher than TRIPs protection should be negotiated in
the FTAA, what should be the level and scope?
(3) What specific enforcement mechanisms should be ne-
gotiated in the FTAA to ensure effective protection?
This Article proposes that the FTAA should negotiate a higher
and clearer level of intellectual property protection than TRIPs.
Part I analyzes the benefits and challenges of a higher standard of
IPR protection for the FTAA. Part II discusses the scope of an
expanded IPR protection under the FTAA. Part III reviews the
specific enforcement mechanisms to ensure effective protection
under the FTAA. This Article concludes that an expanded IPR
standard under the FTAA should be adopted and modeled after
North American Free Trade Agreement.
21. Id. at 174.
22. See generally Reichman, supra note 17 (discussing the benefits afforded coun-
tries with established IPR regimes).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 175.
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I. SHOULD A HIGHER THAN TRIPs STANDARD OF IPR PROTECTION
BE NEGOTIATED IN THE FTAA?
A. Strengthening IPR offers Long Term Gain
I present the case that strengthening IPR creates only transi-
tional losses for developing countries while providing long-term
gains." The economic and social benefits, however, lie as much in
strengthening property rights in general as in any specific new in-
vestment and technology transfer. While empirical research can
show the balance of economic gains and losses, other benefits,
primarily the entrenching of the "rule of law," are not so easily
"proven," though potentially more effective in stimulating sustain-
able economic growth. The long-term economic and social value
of those benefits, not clearly susceptible to empirical measurement,
outweigh the "losses" incurred either by restrictions on copying or
by the granting of so-called "monopoly" privileges.
1. Empirical Debate over the Effect of IPR Standards
Conventional economic analysis of the effects of patents and
other IPR has tried to compare the social or total benefits of in-
creased incentives for innovation against the social cost of the so-
called monopoly right. Various efforts have been made to postu-
late empirical measures with which to validate the respective
claims of net social loss or benefit.26
The standard "empirical" case against strengthening IPR in de-
veloping countries stems from the observation that the short-term
losses cannot help but outweigh the long-term gains because such
IPR laws' would forbid the relatively easy and cheap copying of
25. See Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPs
Requires An Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1941, 1982
(1998) (briefly discussing short-run economic disincentives to intellectual property law
enforcement in China). See also Marie Wilson, TRIPs Agreement Implications For
ASEAN Protection of Computer Technology, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 18, 22-23
(1997) (explaining that enforcement of intellectual property laws "offer[s] long-term
benefits of enhanced employment, economic development, and innovation").
26. See generally, Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 95 (1997)(discussing debate over patent protection).
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foreign patented goods." Unable to produce these goods, in par-
ticular pharmaceutical drugs, developing countries would face an
immediate and insurmountable loss to the welfare of domestic con-
sumers." Further, developing countries would be denied the op-
portunity to develop their economies through a growth-through-
imitation stage such as characterized post-World War II Japan. 9
By this view, the immediate costs of stronger IPRs, including
higher administrative and enforcement expenses, larger royalty
payments, potential price increases in patented products, and the
restriction of "pirate" producers, overwhelm any gains from the
resulting stronger incentive-to-invent which, at any rate, would be
concentrated in the already developed world. 0 This case has been
cast as so obviously empirically valid that relatively little research
was conducted to verify it.
In the last twenty years, however, numerous studies have
sought to measure the effect of changes in IPR standards on such
items as economic growth, foreign direct investment ("FDI"),
technology transfer, and consumer welfare.3 Special mention must
go to the pioneering work of Edwin E. Mansfield of the University
of Pennsylvania.12  The literature to 1990 was ably reviewed by
27. See generally Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case For and
Against Intellectual Property Protection, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
(Wolfgang Siebeck ed. 1990) (discussing the effect on developing countries of strength-
ened IPR protection) ; see also the interesting discussion by Arvind Subramanian, TRIPs
and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical, Temperate View, 13 WORLD ECON. 509-21
(1990).
28. See, e.g., JUDITH C. CHIN & GENE M. GROSSMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT BALDWIN (R.W. Jones & A.O.
Krueger eds., Basil Blackwell 1990) (discussing effects of international trade); see also
GENE GROSSMAN & E. HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(MIT Press 1991)(examining international trade); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Routledge 1995) (discussing regu-
lation of international trade).
29. See Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights,
75 HARV. BUS. REV. 5, 94-103 (1997) (supporting the view for the need for growth
through imitation).
30. See Reichman, supra note 17, at 174.
31. See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Guidance from Economic Theory, in WORLD BANK
DISClSSION PAPERS (1990); Robert E. Evenson, Survey of Empirical Studies, in WORLD
BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS (1990).
32. See Evenson, supra note 31.
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Robert E. Evenson and Carlos A. Primo Braga in a World Bank
study. 33 It is fair to say that the results up to that time were tenta-
tive in their findings.
However, newer studies have begun to demonstrate a consis-
tent positive correlation between stronger IPR and desirable ef-
fects in each of these areas.34 More fine-grained studies have even
shown a relationship between the quality of IPR offered in devel-
oping countries and the specific types of investment undertaken by
multinational corporations ("MNEs").35
Even in the flash point debate over the cost of stronger patent
protection for pharmaceutical drugs, new evidence suggests that
earlier concerns may have been somewhat exaggerated. Canada
provides an instructive example.36
In 1993 in preparation for the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),37 Canada upgraded its intel-
lectual property laws. Specifically, the new law, known popularly
as Bill C-91, ended the practice of compulsory licensing of pat-
33. Id.; see also Richard T. Rapp et al., Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 77-90 (1990) (discussing
costs and benefits of intellectual property protection in developing countries); see also
ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 191-99
(Westview Press 1990) (examining the relationship between economic development and
intellectual property).
34. For correlations between IPRs and economic growth, see Walter G. Park & Juan
Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON.
POL'Y 51-61 (1997); see also Johan Torstensson, Property Rights and Economic Growth:
An Empirical Study, 47 KYKLOS 2, 231-247 (1994); see also Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew
M. Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1, 1-95z (1995). For correlations between IPRs and technology
transfer and FDI see Edwin E. Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Di-
rect Investment, and Technology Transfer, INT'L FIN. CORP. DISCUSSION PAPERS 19 (Int'l
Fin. Corp. 1994) and Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer: Germany, Japan and the United States, INT'L FIN. CORP.
DISCUSSION PAPERS 27 (Int'l Fin. Corp. 1995).
35. See Robert Sherwood, Intellectual Property in the Western Hemisphere, 28
INTER AM. L. REV. 3, 565 (1997).
36. See Owen Lippert, Dr. Bill McArthur & Cynthia Ramsay, A Submission Pre-
pared by The Fraser Institute For the House of Commons Industry Committee Concern-
ing Bill C-91 (A Bill to Amend The Patent Act), (visited Oct. 10, 1998)
<http://www.fraserinstitute.ca>.
37. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 and 605 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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ented pharmaceutical drugs developed by foreign drug compa-
nies. 8 The fear at the time was that these companies would exploit
their "monopoly" position and force up the price of patented
drugs.3 9 Yet, ever since 1993, the average price of patented drugs
has increased below the rate of inflation. For the last two years,
prices have dropped by an average annual rate of two percent. 4° In
Canada, the difference between the prices of patented and generic
drugs is now about twenty percent.4' Though the claim is made
that the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, set up by Bill C-
91 to monitor drug prices and, if necessary, to roll them back, has
contributed to price restraint, the actual number and scope of the
PMPRB interventions have been modest.2 Of more importance,
one could claim, has been the consistently competitive nature of
the pharmaceutical drug market in Canada over which the PMPRB
has no mandate to regulate. In 1993, there were forty-five drug
companies in Canada providing therapeutic-class drugs. The larg-
est held an eight percent market share.43 The same is true today.
44
Canada's experience of relatively benign effects of increased pat-
ent production on the prices of pharmaceutical drugs is not unique,
at least according to a major new study of nine post-IPR reform
countries in the developing world by conducted by Richard P. Ro-
38. See Patent Act Amendment Act of 1992, S.C., ch. 2, § 3 (1993) (Can.).
39. See Debate Rages in Parliament Over Drug-Patent Legislation, BNA PAT., TR.,
& COPYR. L. DAILY, Jan. 6, 1993, at 3. Also see Greg ip, State Intervention, Canadian-
Style: There's a right way and Wrong Way to Guide Markets, THE FINANCIAL POST, Dec.
31, 1994, at 39 (discussing positive effects of patent, including Canadian pharmaceutical
companies increase in research and development of new products and emphasis on ex-
port.)
40. Patented drug prices decreased by approximately 2 percent in 1995. See Barrie
McKenna, Ottawa seeks Prescription for Drug Patent Battle, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 17,
1997, at B4.
41. See Bill MacArthur e-mail of Nov. 26, 1998 (on file with the Journal).
42. See Michael B. Moore, "Open Wide" (Your Pocketbook That Is!) - A Call for
the Establishment in the United States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 149, 151 (1994) (arguing that federal regulation in Canada has
held "drug price inflation below the general inflation rate"). For the actual listing of in-
terventions and annual reports, see the PMPRB website at Prices Medicine Prices Review
Board (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca>.
43. See'IMS Canada Reports New Treatments Push Canadian Pharmaceutical Sales
Up 10% Over 1997, Canada Newswire, Mar. 17, 1998, available in WESTLAW, 3/17/98
CANWIRE 20:10:00.
44. See id.
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zek and Ruth Berkowitz.45
Does this mean the empirical argument has been decided in fa-
vor of higher IPR? Not yet. On the whole, George Priest's words
still ring true, "in the current state of knowledge, economists know
almost nothing about the effects on social welfare of the patent
system or of other systems of intellectual property. '
2. The Theoretical Debate over Stronger IPRs
Beyond the empirical results lies a theoretical debate as to
whether weaker IPR benefits developing countries and stronger
ones harm them .0 At the core of the debate lies the question of
whether IPR are a true individually-held property right or a mo-
nopoly granted by the state to encourage innovation. If the former,
then improvements in IPR protection is presumably desirable,
whatever the empirical results as to social costs. If the latter, then
any change to IPR protections should be subject to some welfare
test.
Much speculation has focused on why implementing stronger
IPR protections in developing countries would fail a welfare test.
Such reasons include the losses from (1) an inability to copy pat-
ented products cheaply and easily, (2) the lack of access to the lat-
est technology and the subsequent dependency of developing
countries on developed ones, and, more recently, (3) the creation
of market abuses by companies' holding monopoly patents. After
discussing the core issue of the identity of IPR, this Article ad-
dresses these three theories, based on a social welfare analysis,
ranged against stronger IPR protection.
45. See Richard P. Rozek & Ruth Berkowitz, The Effects of Patent Protection on
the Prices of Pharmaceutical Products: Is Intellectual Property Protection Raising the
Drug Bill in Developing Countries?, I J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 2, 179-243 (1998).
46. George L. Priest, What Economists can Tell Lawyers about Intellectual Prop-
erty, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS 21 (John Palmer ed., 1986)
47. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Devel-
opment: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DuKE L.J. 831 (1987).
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a. Are Intellectual Property Rights subject to the Law
or Monopoly Privileges subject to Competition
Policy?
The debate over the nature of IPRs, and patents in particular,
traces back to the very first patent. When the city fathers of Flor-
ence granted the patent No. 1 to Filippo Brunelleschi, who had in-
vented a loading crane for ships, their economic self-interest, not
any sense of property rights, guided them.48 The preamble to this
first patent bluntly states: "he refuses to make such machine avail-
able to the public, in order that the fruit of his genius and skill may
not be reaped by another without his will and consent; and that, if
he enjoyed some prerogative concerning this, he would open up
what he is hiding, and would disclose it to all., 4 9 From this per-
spective, patents would appear as a regulatory form of monopoly
created to serve the "instrumentalist" end of encouraging inventors
to invent.50
Yet, if for the rulers of Florence and Venice and shortly there-
after the German and Dutch trade cities, the granting of a patent
was simply a calculation of costs and benefits, for Brunellschi, and
inventive individuals who followed him. It was a revolution in
their economic and legal relationship to both the state and the
broader business community. They held a property right, if only
temporarily protected, to the relatively exclusive use and control of
the physical and practical forms derived from their unique insights
into the possibilities of matter. What they owned the state could
not seize nor competitors steal. Thus from its beginning the patent
embodied, in the, words of Michael P. Ryan, "the philosophical
tension between natural property rights and public welfare-en-
hancing incentives for risky investment."'"
48. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 17
(Public Affairs Press 1967).
49. Id.
50. See A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs-Natural Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism', 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (discussing the concept of natural
rights in patent law).
51. MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 (Brookings Inst. Press 1998).
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One could, indeed, write the history of patent law as the shift-
ing balance as to the relative value of personal property rights ver-
sus a mere incentive for innovation and investment. Deputies of
the National Assembly during the French Revolution asserted that
an inventor's property right in his or her discovery represented one
of the "rights of man." They desired in part to restrict the state and
the aristocrats who controlled it from exploiting productive and in-
novative members of the bourgeoisie. In contrast, Thomas Jeffer-
son, worried less about aristocrats and more about the social value
of proprietary knowledge, wrote Article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution to establish patents for strictly utilitarian purposes; in his
words, "to promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts.
2
One might even conclude that personal interests will forever
determine the debate. On the one side, inventors and their lawyers
insist that intellectual property rights are about preventing theft.
On the other politicians and economic planners assert that patent
"law" concerns the balance between industrial incentives and the
diffusion of useful knowledge. Yet, there are three reasons to
choose the property rights side in this debate: convention, the
evolutionary nature of rights, and capitalism's revealing of the
value of IPRs as rights.
i. Convention
Convention, too often, is underrated when compared to sup-
posedly objective analysis. It is convention that gives patent the
legal form of a property right and determines its specific length.
Economists did not determine that the socially optimal length of a
patent should be twenty years; indeed, there are probably too many
uncertainties ever to decide such a question. One could say that
patents are not actually at all about the duration of an intellectual
property right, but rather for how long the state is willing to defend
it on behalf of the inventor.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The United States Constitution grants Congress
the power to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Id. See also Tom Bethell, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND
PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 262 (St. Martin's Press 1998).
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A maddening feature of convention is that history provides few
straight answers as to why patents evolve from something close to
blackmail in Renaissance Florence to a right defined and protected
by the common law in the modem Anglo-American tradition.
Still, convention, though malleable, deserves respect even if its un-
derlying logic may appear elusive."
There is also the possibility that convention generates its own
strong economic efficiency argument for IPR as rights. That ar-
gument is the same as the efficiency argument for the common law
made by such scholars as Richard Posner, William Landes, and
Richard Epstein." They contend that, for reasons of historic acci-
dent and particular human ingenuity, the English common law de-
veloped a set of procedural and substantive principles which over
time have generated economically efficient answers to disputes. 6
Epstein identifies the few "simple rules," which with the intellec-
tual discipline imposed by the doctrine of stare decisis, gave the
common law its capacity to lead to efficient results." These are,
"individual autonomy, first possession - property rights, voluntary
exchange, control of aggression, limited privileges for cases of ne-
cessity, and just compensation for 'takings' of private property. 58
These are the same principles which apply, more or less, to intel-
53. Convention has no more solemn voice than that of the ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANICA which states: "[a] patent is recognized as a species of property and has the
attributes of personal property. It may be sold (assigned) to others or mortgaged or may
pass to the heirs of a deceased inventor." 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRInrANICA, 194 (15th ed.,
1994).
54. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Indi-
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1573 n.202
(1993) ("A plausible argument can be made that intellectual property rights will
indeed increase efficiency. The focus of such arguments tends to be the contention that,
in the absence of property rights, there will be underproduction due to 'free rider' prob-
lems).
55. See generally WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF TORT LAW (4th ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (3d. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1988) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
56. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at 10.
57. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 15.
58. Id.
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lectual property today in developed countries.
In the end, one can agree that holding a patent differs from
owning a shotgun. The distinction between them is that of pos-
sessing a thing as opposed to the opportunity to make use of novel
and useful idea or insight. Yet, the mutual quality of exclusivity
before the eyes of the law binds them together. If it walks like a
duck, sounds like a duck, and looks like a duck, it probably is a
duck.
One qualification in the context of negotiating IPR in the
FTAA is that most Latin American countries have a Civil Code
tradition. As a result, their legal systems do not possess clear
counterparts to stare decisis and other common law principles. 9
Nevertheless, Civil Code reasoning itself, has changed around the
world, and the blending of Civil Code content and common law
reasoning has been a hallmark of this century, particularly as leg-
islation has gradually codified case law.6" Models for further con-
vergence do exist, such as the legal system of the Canadian prov-
ince of Quebec.6'
ii. The Evolutionary Nature of Rights
The power of convention is such that even though IPR may not
have begun as a property right, they have evolved towards that
identity. That is that their nature as property rights has been dis-
covered gradually over time. This begs the question what then are
rights? Simply put, they are protections of behavior and property
which a society decides at some point to place outside of a cost to
benefit analysis.62
Critics contend that the defenders of IPR as rights ultimately
base their position on a notion that IPR are natural rights as defined
59. See generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CiviL. LAw TRADrION (1969) (discuss-
ing the civil law tradition effect upon judicial systems).
60. See id.
61. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Toxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5, 26 (identifying Quebec as a "mixed system"). See
also Jeffrey L. Friesen, When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (stating that Quebec combines civil and common law traditions in its le-
gal system).
62. Seeid. at415.
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by John Locke. 63 That is if we have a natural right to own the fruits
of our labor, we have no less a right to own the fruits of our inge-
nuity. What they attack is not the strength of the proposition, but
rather the somewhat mystical nature of natural rights.
It is a reflection of our age that an appeal to the laws of nature
falls under immediate suspicion. Regardless, what is important
about IPR as rights is not their ultimate source. More significantly,
they, as with other property rights, may be seen to represent pre-
transactional social values64 which provide a dividing line between
the state and the individual as to the control of material possessions
and of physical and mental effort. In contrast, if patents are con-
strued as welfare-based regulations, then they constitute post-
transactional distributions of wealth guided by the state towards a
variety of social goals.65
A risk exists in trying too hard to deny the development of
IPRs into fully accepted property rights. As Roger E. Meiners and
Robert J. Staaf conclude "there is no basis to classify intellectual
property as the grant of monopoly rights, unless numerous other
rights that involve exclusion, such as home ownership or labor
services, are classified as monopoly rights. 66 The further the state
comes to see itself as the creator of value, the greater the tempta-
tion to use supposedly neutral utilitarian analysis to further its own,
or rather its employees and beneficiaries, self interest.
iii. The Nature of IPR Change as Capitalism Changes
Just as the Renaissance created "new facts" as to the nature of
capitalism and to the nature of man thus altering profoundly the
treatment of innovation, so, too, may contemporary thinking about
capitalism and the nature of man re-shape the value afforded to
intellectual property protections. It may well tip the balance far-
ther towards a property-rights based conception of intellectual
63. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § V (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
64. See Richard A. Epstein, Foreward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998).
65. See id.
66. See Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks:
Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 940 (1990).
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property.
The impetus, the "new facts" lies beyond the obvious-an
economy increasingly driven by technological advances and thus
more heavily dependent on proprietary knowledge, be it in the
new, computers and software, or the traditional, medicine and agri-
culture. This greater dependence on intellectual property is not
changing the nature of modern capitalism, but rather allowing it to
operate at a qualitatively higher level of efficiency.
New communication tools have sped the diffusion of both
market information and production thus speeding up the articula-
tion of consumer preferences and the ability of producers to re-
spond. It is no longer necessary to have either a central market or
a central factory. Technology has simplified and automated
monitoring and process functions, thus reducing both transaction
costs and personnel costs relative to a unit of economic output.
Technology has allowed us to become more productive while at
the same time subject us to fewer hierarchical and personal con-
trols. Just as the innovations of banking and insurance awoke
Florence to the possibilities of early capitalism, the greater eco-
nomic role of intellectual property has brought into clearer focus
Friederich Hayek's vision of "extended order" through the "rule of
law."
As entrepreneurs flourish and more individuals work for them-
selves, roughly one in six North Americans, the concept of pro-
ductive work in a capitalist economy has embraced new decen-
tralized configurations. Work can be self-directed. High levels of
economic activity can be sustained by networks of self-contracting
individuals and not just by economies-of-scale corporations. This
emergent free-agent capitalism will, in turn, give greater weight to
another insight of "Austrian Economics" that our "producer sur-
plus" lies less in the hours of our labour and more in our creativ-
ity.67
It would be insufficient to argue circularly that current capital-
ism's success with "owned" knowledge, such as patents, proves
the case that property law, not policy wishes guide decision-
67. VIRGINIA POSTRELL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES: THE GROWING CONFLICT
OVER CREATIVrrY, ENTERPRISE, AND PROGRESS 35 (The Free Press 1998).
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makers. Just as in the Renaissance, economic opportunity is alone
an incomplete force to change attitudes.
As in the Fifteenth Century, the legal recognition of intellectual
property arose in response to both a new form of economic organi-
zation and to a new sense not just of self, but of its abstraction -
the individual. If we are not surprised today that the nature of the
economy is in flux, neither should we be if our ideas of the indi-
vidual are shifting. At least, Western history shows individualism
to possess an ontology or a story of change.68 This cannot help but
to alter the cultural boundaries within which we cast the nature and
treatment of innovation and innovators. After all, it was a cham-
pion of the individual, not of economics, Lysander Spooner, the
Nineteenth Century libertarian, who first coined the potent phrase,
"intellectual property," recasting unalterably the debate.69  f
Will our society, in the new millennium, recognize even
greater individual autonomy, thus further shielding IPR from state
interventions? It should, but wishes are poor predictions. Still, if
the hard-edged men of Renaissance Florence could figure out the
advantage of patents in the first place, perhaps we can discern the
added value of more firmly conceiving of intellectual property as
individual property before the law.
b. The Welfare Tests for not Strengthening IPR
The point here is not to argue against standard normative eco-
nomic analysis of intellectual property protections. It is just to
point out that several of the efforts to do so have been fraught with
problems, perhaps the result less of the underlying economic
methodology and more of the researchers' biases in scope, duration
and policy. The whole area deserves a thorough intellectual
audit.70
68. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 8-14 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989).
69. See BETHELL supra note 52, at 259.
70. See Vivian S. Kuo & Gerald J. Mossinghoff, World Patent System Circa 20XX,
A.D., 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 529,537 (1998).
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i. The Cost of Copying
A welfare analysis might easily prove governments in devel-
oping nations should encourage the free copying of foreign tech-
nology in order to jump start domestic industries at a relatively low
cost. There is, however, one good reason to be skeptical that
things will work out that way--the behavior of individuals in the
market place typically frustrates the best-laid designs of govern-
ment planners.
The following scenario demonstrates one possible outcome.
Suppose a country orders the compulsory licensing of a MNE's
patent, then awards the license to a domestic producer. That pro-
ducer now possesses a "free good." That does not mean, however,
that he has withdrawn from the market and all of its familiar dy-
namics and, thus, that the consumer will benefit from lower prices.
First of all, the domestic producer will likely charge a "shadow"
price, a price that is just below what patent-holders charged,
knowing that the market will bear that price.7" Though the pro-
ducer will try to maximize his output with lower prices, he remains
committed to increasing his surplus, not the consumer's.7 In addi-
tion, the producer may also wish not to upset the politicians and
bureaucrats who control the compulsory licenses.
As a result, the consumer's surplus may be quite small. It is
likely to be smaller when the patent holder is forced to retreat from
the market and the domestic producer no longer has to worry about
competition in future price-setting decisions. More seriously, con-
sumer could face the loss of potential surplus gains from new and
improved products as patent holders delay entry into that market. 3
71. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 16 (4th ed. 1992)
(explaining "shadow price").
72. See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing
Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 89 n. 186 (1997) (presenting the debate
surrounding "consumer surplus" and "product surplus"); also see Calvin S. Goldman &
John D. Bodrug, The Merger Review Process: The Canadian Experience, 65 ANTITRUST
L.J. 573, 583 (1997) (revealing another perspective in this debate).
73. For an analysis of the lost consumer surplus from "market chill" due to price
controls, see generally OWEN LIPPERT, DRUG PRICE CONTROLS: WRONG SOLUTION FOR A
NON-EXISTENT PROBLEM (Fraser Inst. forthcoming 1999). For an attempt to measure the
effect of access to improved drugs in terms of life span and lifetime income, see Frank
Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Mortality Reduction, and Economic Growth,
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One should not, however, be too much of an alarmist. Patent hold-
ers might still sell their products in risky markets, just more, cau-
tiously.
One could argue that if compulsory licenses were granted to
multiple domestic producers, then this would stimulate the compe-
tition necessary to improve the consumer's surplus. Further re-
search is needed to learn the extent to which compulsory licenses
have been assigned to single or multiple domestic producers. I
suspect that single producer licenses predominate for the reasons
given below.
ii. Public Choice Perspective on Compulsory
Licensing
Public Choice theory provides: a reason for why compulsory li-
censing might lead to unintended consequences.7 4 Compulsory li-
censing would appear to be a form of "producer capture" of regu-
latory bodies. That is, domestic producers in developing countries
protect their own interests by convincing governments of the need
to issue compulsory licenses of MNEs'75 patents.7 6 After the deci-
sion has been made, market tests are concocted to justify the ex-
propriation. The political risk attached to compulsory licensing is
initially quite low, as MNEs are generally unloved and unappreci-
ated creatures of the United States and Europe.77 The government
officials who dispense these "rent-seeking" licenses do so in ex-
change for reasons ranging from the satisfaction of administering
"industrial policy" to the public acclaim of protecting national
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH: WORKING PAPER No. 6569 (1998).
74. For a general discussion of Public Choice Theory, see generally Paul B. Stephan
III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995).
75. See Robert C. Griffitts, Broadening the States' Power To Tax Foreign Multina-
tional Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 243,
283 (1996) ("MNE is commonly used as a synonym for multinational corporation.").
76. See Michael L. Shaln, Thailand's Board of Investment: Towards a More Appro-
priate and Effective Rural Investment Promotion Policy, 3 PAC. Rim L. & POL'Y J. 141,
182 (1994).
77. See Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 208, 246-47
(1985).
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economic sovereignty to the accepting of outright bribes.78
It is hard to see how the consumers' interest would have a high
priority in mutual rent-seeking agreements between domestic pro-
ducers and government.79 In short, the so-called economic benefits
of compulsory licensing may prove to be merely the transfer of in-
come from politically docile consumers to politically potent pro-
ducers."
The irony here is that domestic producers may not gain as
much in the long run as they had expected. Economist Gordon
Tullock observed that the profit record of companies protected by
tariffs and government regulations did not appear to differ sub-
stantially from those not protected. As a result, he postulated that
any one company's gains made from government privileges, such
as compulsory licenses, will not last.8  They will be caught in a
transitional gains trap in which bureaucrats and politicians will
seek to capture their own rents from favored companies through a
variety of means.83 There is also the risk that the government will
later cancel IPR privileges, such as compulsory licenses, in order
to achieve more desired gains, such as trade access, in multilateral
trade agreements.
78. See Finland: Computer Networking Hardware/Software Market, INDUS. SECTOR
ANALYSIS, June 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11163465.
79. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent Developments in Trade and Policy
and Scholarship - and Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 NW. J. INT'L. L. &
Bus. 759, 772-73 (1996-1997).
80. See J.H. MacLaughlin, T.J. Richards & L.A. Kenny, The Economic Significance
of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?
(R.M. Gadbaw & T.J. Richards, eds., Westview Press, 1988).
81. See GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT SEEING 224-35
(1993).
82. See id.
83. Tulloch states that, "[t]he successors to the original beneficiaries will not nor-
mally make exceptional profits. Unfortunately, they will usually be injured by any can-
cellation of the original gift. It would seem, as David Friedman has put it, that 'govern-
ment cannot even give anything away."' Id. at 476-78.
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iii. Lack of Access to Technology and Dependency
A popular view holds that foreign technology is sine qua non
necessary for economic growth in the developing world.14 As a re-
sult, how it is less important how technology is acquired than that
it is. Presumably, lower IPR standards best assure access to new
technology. 5
The discussion mirrors the error in the post-war development
debate that simple capital accumulation could drive economic de-
velopment.86 That view has come under siege now that the billions
spent in development aid are increasingly judged to have produced
only marginal benefits for the average citizen in the developing
world. To paraphrase the English economists, Peter T. Bauer and
Basil S. Yamey, substituting the word "technology" for "capital",
"[iut is often nearer the truth to say that 'technology' is created in
the process of economic development than that development is a
function of 'technology' formation.""7 Few would deny that new
technology plays some role in the economic growth of developing
countries. Still, the means by which it was acquired might indicate
the quality of pre-transactional property rights that may help to
determine the long-term economic benefits derived.
The focus on foreign technology may also perpetuate the now
problematic "dependency" theories of Argentine social scientist
and former director of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD"), Raul Prebisch.8 He assumed that
technology could only come from the Center, and that dependency
of Periphery on the Center is an active cause of under-
development. 9 Granted, many Latin American countries have not
84. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
86. See Lena Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?, 32 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 545, 551-52 (1997).
87. See Alan Rufus Waters, Economic Growth and the Property Rights Regime, in
THE REVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 109 (James A. Dom et al. eds., Cato Inst.
1998).
88. See, e.g., Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, AM. ECON. REV.
May 1959, at 251-73 (examining commercial policies in underdeveloped countries).
89. Id.; see also Dr. Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western
Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INT. L. & POL'Y 683, 699 (1993) (discussing trade arrangements
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had the experience of strong IPR and may not fully understand its
positive effects on indigenous technology. 9° Still, there is no rea-
son to assume that these countries could not generate as many ad-
vances in knowledge on a per capita basis as any other. The prob-
lem lies not in the intelligence and creativity of the citizenry, but in
the institutional protections afforded the fruits of their labor.9'
Among the more critical factors is the institutional framework
which determines the incentives and transactional costs of con-
tracting. As Nobel Prize-winning economist, Douglass C. North
asserts, it is institutions and ideology that together shape economic
performance. Institutions affect economic performance by deter-
mining the costs of transacting- and producing.92 The work of
Douglass C. North and others such as Oliver Williamson, referred
to as the New Institutional Economics, builds upon the seminal
ideas of Ronald Coase in his two now famous articles on the nature
of the firm and on transaction costs.
93
Briefly stated, one of Coase's fundamental insight is this: the
sustained economic success of a country does not depend on any
initial or subsequent endowment of capital and technology, but
rather on its ability to maintain institutions of formal and informal
rules that keep low "the costs of measuring the valuable attributes
of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and
policing and enforcing agreements." 94 At the core of reducing
transaction costs is a stable, clear and enforced system of property
rights.95  As Armen Alchian pointed out over thirty years ago,
in the Western Hemisphere).
90. See, e.g., Amy R. Edge, Preventing Software Piracy Through Regional Trade
Agreements: The Mexican Example, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 175, 193-95
(1994) (examining Mexico's response to software piracy through trade agreements).
91. See id. at 193-99.
92. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); see also OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (The Free Press 1987).
93. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW, 33-55, 174-79 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1988).
94. See NORTH, supra note 92, at 27; see also Avinash Dixit, The Making of Eco-
nomic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective, in MUNICH LECTURES IN
ECONOMICS 37 (MIT Press 1996).
95. See Joel P. Trachtman, Section IV: A Sketch of the law and economics of prop-
erty rights, in Chapter 17, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics
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"[t]he existing system of property rights establishes the system of
price determination for the exchange of or allocation of scarce re-
sources. Many apparently diverse questions come down to the
same element - the structure of property rights over scarce re-
sources. In essence, economics is the study of property rights."96
IPR are part of a legal and institutional framework, which by
lowering transaction costs, can create the conditions necessary for
economic growth. If strong protections can be created and held in
place, contractual efficiency should ensure that not only will new
local technology be discovered, but more importantly, domestic
and international technology can be fully exploited. Faith in this
possibility may explain why both EMBRAPA, the research arm of
the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, and ABRABI, an association
of Brazilian biotechnology companies, have come out in support of
their country's upgrading of IPR protections.97 Contractual effi-
ciency should also lower the costs and improve the results of local
industries receiving, adapting, and utilizing foreign technology. 'It
is only an assertion, but one worthy of further research, that overall
contractual efficiency could also compensate for the costs and in-
conveniences to second stage innovation caused by researchers
having to invent around existing patents. 9 A society's overall
contractual efficiency, however that may be measured, may prove
critical in its ability both to adapt and invent new technology.
of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES, 658, 658-682 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan
0. Sykes, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997).
96. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN,. PRICING AND SOCIETY 6 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs ed., 1967).
97. Telephone interview with Robert Sherwood, Attorney and Consultant, in
Washington, D.C. (July 30, 1998).
98. See R.P. Merges & R.R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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iv. IPR and Anti-trust Law: An Uneasy Mixture
The latest welfare test of IPR has arisen from the application of
competition policy or anti-trust law in the American vernacular. 99
The equation of IPR and market "monopolies" has raised the pos-
sibility of new constraints on the exercise and scope of IPR.
Whether patents, for instance, should be subject to anti-trust
policies is still a fluid question. Kenneth W. Dam argues that the
use of the word "monopoly" to describe patents was a political
definition of the Depression-era American Supreme Court borne of
the Depression, rather than a product of economic analysis.'0 Still,
The United States and other countries, through case law and legis-
lation respectively, have for some time restricted some actions by
patent holders if it is determined that their patents 'create "market
power." Courts of the United States have developed'the doctrine of
"patent abuse,"'0' including the grounds upon which a patent holder
may be forced to grant a license.0 2 They have also developed pro-
hibitions against patent holder linking the grant of a license to the
purchase of another product.0 3
99. See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement: Introduction to
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 374-78 (1996). See generally,
COMPETTSION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998) (discussing intellectual
property rights and competition policy).
100. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinning of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 268-70 (1994).
101. See Amy Jacqueline Grason, IBM v. Comdisco: Are Modified 3090 Computers
Counterfeit?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 93, 117 & n.160 (1994). The
doctrine of patent abuse reflects one view of the judiciary in which intellectual property
rights could pose a danger to a free marketplace. See id. The modem status of the doc-
trine of patent abuse is somewhat unclear. Kevin J. Arquit, Patent Abuse and the Anti-
trust Laws, 59 ANTITRUST L. J., 735, 740-42 (1991). The essence of the doctrine is that
where a patent is used to unreasonably restrain trade, it cannot be enforced until a
"purge" has been effected. Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse: Portents for the 1990s, 59
ANTITRUST L. J., 687, 689-92 (1991). The patent abuse doctrine derives from the obser-
vation that patents are "an exception to the general rule against monopolies," and thus
cannot be unlimited. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 846 (1945).
102. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas, 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (holding
that company conduct did not arise to patent abuse).
103. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Linkage is the issue largely at heart in the American Justice
Department's current action against the Microsoft Corporation.'0 4
It is alleged that Microsoft Corporation would not license the Win-
dows Operating System to computer manufacturers unless their
Internet Explorer was included.05
The risk exists that the use of anti-trust doctrines may uninten-
tionally reduce such IPR benefits such as the incentive-to-invent.t6
Potential for misuse grows out of a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of patents. A patent does not guarantee any position,
dominant or otherwise, in a market. It is simply one protection af-
forded to an individual or company seeking to make an economic
rent from a unique innovation. 7 By its definition, a unique inno-
vation creates a unique new market.08 A patent only grants exclu-
sivity to the invention, not to the market served by the invention.'9
An invention, by its success in a market, may actually stimulate re-
search by others to re-create that success with a new product.
The important questions about the market power of a patent are
whether substitutes exist for a new product-is the market contest-
able and whether other individuals have the opportunity to invent
new substitutes. If the answer to both is "yes," then there cannot
exist a monopoly as understood in economics. In practice, the
dominant position of any new bit of intellectual property in the
market has not lasted for long and usually not as long as the patent
or copyright protection afforded."0 Put another way, Microsoft
Windows will eventually face much stiffer competition than it does
today, which will arise sooner rather than later."' The very ups
and downs of the Microsoft case suggest great caution in judging
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. For a supporting discussion based on a study of the results of using the "essen-
tial facilities doctrine" to order compulsory licenses, see R. J. Gilbert & C. Shapiro, An
Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC.
NATL. ACAD. Sci. U.S. 249,249-55 (1996).
107. See id. at 249-251.
108. Seeid.
109. See Dam, supra note 97, at 270.
110. See Reuven Brenner, Market Power: Innovations and Anti-Trust, in THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY 179-216 (F. Mattheson et al. eds., Fraser Inst.
1990).
111. See supra note 103-104 and accompanying text.
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the market effects of patents in an anti-trust legal framework.
To date, international trade agreements have incorporated only
a few, relatively ill-defined anti-trust policies. The TRIPs agree-
ment, however, creates the possibility for the inclusion of further
antitrust measures." 2 The issue is a familiar one in which some
welfare test, rather the procedural protections of property law,
might determine the extent of IPR protections.
Indeed, Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse have argued
that countries should be able to use their IPR standards to their
competitive advantage." 3 By the same measure, they would also
design other forms of regulation, such as environmental and health
and safety standards to advance domestic industrial policy." 4 They
argue further that international trade agreements ought to entrench
the flexibility of standards to ensure that such a comparative ad-
vantage can be exploited.
One can agree with Trebilcock and Howse that countries
should have the scope under any trade negotiation to tailor their
regulatory regimes to their advantage within, of course, the bounds
of their international commitments."' IPR, however, should be
considered part of a country's legal foundation of rights, and not of
its regulatory regime. As said earlier, IPR are more properly part
of a social pact on pre-transactional values rather than the distribu-
tion of post-transactional income.
The court of world opinion would rightly condemn a country if
it argued that upholding human rights imposed a unfair competi-
tive disadvantage. Property rights are human rights, and intellec-
tual property rights are property rights. All deserve respect.
112. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2(1).
113. See id.
114. See Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory
Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EURO. J.L. &
ECON. 5, 5-37 (1998) [hereinafter Trebilcock & Howse I]; Michael Trebilcock & Robert
Howse, Trade-Related Intellectual Property in THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (2d ed. Routledge 1998) [hereinafter Trebilcock & Howse II].
115. Seeid.
19981
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3. IPR as an Integral Part of the Critical Package of
Rights
In sum, IPRs are just one, perhaps small, part of the complete
package of individual rights upon which sustainable economic op-
portunity and development ultimately depends." 6  If a country
chooses to adopt one set of accepted rights because they are valued
and convenient, it cannot then ignore other rights or downgrade
them to regulatory options, without weakening rights as a whole.
This is consistent with the oft-heard argument that developing
countries pursue an immature and short-sighted strategy in solely
pursuing property rights while, at the same time, largely ignoring
civil and political rights."7
The value of adopting stronger IPR protection in developing
countries lies in the additional pressure to strengthen their institu-
tional capacity to define, monitor, and enforce property rights as a
whole."8 In this light, Edmund Kitch's "prospect theory" argued
that the value of IPR lay in its ability to control the development of
breakthrough discoveries deserves a more positive evaluation than
it seems to be getting. "' The short-term costs include the upgrad-
ing of the judicial, legal, and administrative systems, the training
of the legal community, and the bolstering of private managerial
competence to contract and license technology. 2 ° These are com-
paratively small costs in dollar terms, but much larger in the sense
that they depend on conveying a vision of why and how they will
benefit a country. The largest cost is the cost of restraining gov-
ernments from exploiting IPR in order to play industrial favorites
for the benefit of some producers, politicians, and bureaucrats.'
In a climate of robust property rights, governments are not un-
116. See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protec-
tion in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 465,469 (1994).
117. See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Properly Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 122 (1993).
118. See Willard Alonzo Stanback, International Intellectual Properly Protection:
An Integrated Solution to the Inadequate Protection Problem, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517, 523
(1989).
119. For a discussion of Kitch's "prospect theory," see J.H. Reichman, supra note
99, at 371-72.
120. See id. at 372-79.
121. See id.
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duly restrained. They may choose to expropriate intellectual prop-
erty as long as due compensation is paid. Consistent with the "rule
of law," governments can use creative measures such as patent
buy-outs to ensure the rapid diffusion of technology and knowl-
edge. This has happened before. In 1839, the French government
purchased the patent on the Daguerreotype process and placed it in
the public domain.' That decision allowed France to lead the
world in the creative development of photography during the sub-
sequent century.
B. If the Negotiation of Higher IPR Standards is an Effective
Lever to Advance Free Trade, Then Let it be Used to
Greatest Effect
Though often questioned and challenged, free trade remains the
dominant policy to improve the welfare of individuals in the
world.2 3 Despite the stunted "import-bad, export-good" mentality
of the seven GATT Rounds, they have brought the world closer to
realizing the benefits of global free trade. Average global tariffs
on manufactured goods have fallen from forty percent to three per-
cent since the implementation of the Uruguay Round cuts have
been implemented. 4 Given the importance of trade in the post-
war economic growth of developed and developing countries, it is
surprising that it took so long to examine the state of domestic IPR
regimes, both as source of potential non-tariff barrier to trade and
as a bargaining chip in multilateral trade negotiations.
122. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Inno-
vation Program, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 6304
(1997). Kremer claims "such patent buy-outs could eliminate monopoly price distortions
and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering, while raising private incentives for origi-
nal research closer to their social value." Id.
123. For the challenges, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE (1996).
124. See id.
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1. Why did the Rise of Counterfeiting lead to the linking
of IPR and Trade?
IPR did not arise as a trade issue out of some theoretical appre-
ciation of the benefits of free trade.15 The genesis lay in the con-
cluding years of the Tokyo Round when the United States sought a
new lever, trade access, to suppress counterfeiting. 6 By raising
the matter in the GATT talks, American negotiators sought to lev-
erage wider access to the United States market against improved
IPR enforcement in other countries."7 Most nations, unfamiliar
with this novel linkage, resisted and nothing initially came of the
American initiative."' Merits of this particular linkage aside, it
made strategic sense to introduce at least some linkages in the
GATT talks because of the wider scope for concluding complex
agreements when multiple trade-offs are available.1
29
The United States' concern over counterfeiting seemed to some
an over-reaction, given both the small percentage of the American
economy dependent upon exports, ranging between ten and fifteen
percent, and the relatively small amount of lost revenue, which
even the most generous of estimates placed at between $15 to $20
billion out of an annual foreign trade of $850 billion in 1996.130
Yet the intensity of the American concern reflected the concentra-
tion of those losses in three key industries: computer software,
motion pictures, and pharmaceutical drugs. 3' These industries,
125. For the latest background on this development see RYAN, supra at note 51, at
48.
126. The following section owes its insights to conversations with former Canadian
trade officials Michael Hart, Carleton University and Sylvia Ostry, University of To-
ronto; former United States chief negotiator for NAFTA, Julius Katz, Washington, D.C.,
and professors Michael Trebilcock, University of Toronto and J.A. VanDuser, University
of Ottawa.
127. See supra note 126 and the accompanying text.
128. See id.
129. For a discussion of the regional and multilateral approaches, see Keith E.
Maskus, Implications of Regional and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property
Rights, 20 THE WORLD ECONOMY 5, 681-94 (1997).
130. See JONATHAN D. ARONSON ET AL., PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5
(1998).
131. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Ralph Oman, The World Intellectual Property
Organization: A United Nations Success Story, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
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unlike others, purportedly receive roughly fifty percent of their to-
tal receipts from overseas markets.
As preparations began for the Urugu'ay Round, the United
States representatives re-thought how to introduce the counterfeit-
ing issue. As the Americans deliberated, they realized that pursu-
ing counterfeiting alone was the equivalent of looking down the
wrong end of the telescope.'32 To achieve any progress in the area
of counterfeiting meant addressing the broader issue of intellectual
property. Under this view, counterfeiting was just one manifesta-
tion of the fragmented and porous IPR regimes that presented
American businesses with both the prospect and reality of lost
profits due to illegal or legal copying."'
The American initiative to raise IPR in trade negotiations also
reflected a dissatisfaction with the substantive international IPR
standards maintained by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("WIPO") and the enforcement mechanisms provided by the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 13 4 To be fair, WIPO and the
ICJ were never intended to be the cop and judge of international
intellectual property.'35 They were designed as means to help
countries look after their own IPR regimes. 136 They faced the
challenge of any multilateral organization in setting an interna-
tional agenda: in order to achieve consensus among the member
states, some 129 in the case of WIPO as of 1995, substantial com-
promises have to be made. In the case of WIPO's model frame-
691, 691-92 (1997).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO is responsible for administering the
terms of, among others, the Paris and Berne Conventions as amended by periodic diplo-
matic conferences. The Paris and Beme Conventions allow countries to -bring disputes to
the ICJ. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
revised Oct. 31, 1958, art. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 109, 115, as last revised at Stockholm, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. See also
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, com-
pleted at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed at Berne
on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
135. See id.
136. See Trebilcock & Howse I, supra note 114, at 258.
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work law for IPR, exceptions placed the level of protection at the
lowest common denominator.'37 As a result, it has continued to
lose relevance to the actual contemporary practice of trade in
goods and services with significant intellectual property content.'38
The ICJ, suffice to say, has never actually heard an IPR case and, if
it did, it would only serve to clarify what the WIPO model frame-
work law states. 3 9
The American decision to pursue IPR standards in the Uruguay
Round also reflected a need to shore up domestic support for trade
liberalization.' 40 The inevitable reaction to any major effort to
lower tariffs is fear of new competition in goods and wages.1
4
'
Ross Perot, Patrick Buchanan, and the AFL-CIO all enjoyed sub-
stantial amounts of media attention by playing to the "blue-collar"
fears of factories packing up in the middle of the night to sneak off
to Tiajuana. 142 Allies were needed. What better allies than the in-
dustries who stood the most to gain. It is not unfair to say that the
pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industries were ma-
neuvered into fighting some of the United States administration's
non-IPR battles. 43
2. The Origins and Significance of TRIPs
As a result of the efforts of the United States government, the
Uruguay Round established a separate set of discussions to reach a
minimum set of standards for IPR protection among the GATT
signatory nations.'" These talks ultimately led to the 1994 TRIPs
agreement. The content of the discussions has been closely, almost
137. See id. at 263.
138. See id.
139. See Monique L. Cordray, GA7T v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 121, 131 (1994).
140. See JEFFREY J. SCHOTr ASSISTED BY JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY
ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 30 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. 1994).
141. See id. at32-33.
142. See id. at 33.
143. See generally Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 95 (1997) (examining the trial and tribulations of
patent protection and pharmaceutical innovation).
144. See SCHOTT, supra note 140, at 30.
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exhaustively, analyzed. 45 Most agree the nub was a global pack-
age deal: the United States would, itself, provide, and would pres-
sure the European Community to grant the same, greater market
access to the agricultural and textile products of the developing
world in exchange for a agreement on an international standard for
IPR.' 46
The TRIPs agreement, building on the principles of the Paris
and Berne conventions, obliged signatories to adhere to, first, an
international baseline for standards of protection for all areas of
intellectual property-patents, trademarks, copyrights. 147  Second,
TRIPs requires effective enforcement measures, both at the border
and internally. 48 Third, the signatories must adhere to the dispute
settlement provisions of the World Trade Organization
( "WT O ).
'149
The prospect of TRIPs helped to motivate American support
for the Uruguay Round. 5° Without a strong commitment by the
United States Government, the Uruguay Round could have failed
to advance the cause of free trade. 5' It nearly did anyway. Though
some developing countries questioned the price of TRIPs in terms
of lost economic sovereignty, the gains from increased trade access
proved irresistible, particularly considering the alternative of in-
creased unilateral trade sanctions under the United State's Section
301 and Special or "Super" 301 processes."'
145. See id.
146. See Cordray supra note 139, at 143.
147. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2(1).
148. See id. at arts. 41-61.
149. See id. at art. 64.
150. See SCHOTT, supra note 140, at 30.
151. See id.
152. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act gives
the President and his delegate, the United States Trade Representative, the ability to in-
vestigate government practices in other countries to see if they present an unfair burden
to American firms. Special 301 of the 1988 Trade Act specifically covers IPRs protec-
tion and the market access for knowledge-intensive American goods. Special 301
authorizes the United States Trade Representative to remove trade benefits such as MFN
trade rates if after a set deadline the offending government's practices are not modified or
removed. The exercise of Special 301 penalties remain consistent with the United
States's WTO commitments as long as WTO dispute settlement procedures have been
accessed first.
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The FTAA presents one more opportunity to bring global free
trade closer to reality. It would set the example of an entire hemi-
sphere removing tariffs and other barriers, if one takes at face
value the declaration of the thirty-four national leaders at the 1994
Miami Summit of the Americas. The prospect of improved IPR
standards may once again persuade the American government to
take a strong leadership role.
It would be misleading and counter-productive to characterize
the current negotiations as simply the United States trying to extort
concessions from its reluctant neighbors. First, many hemispheric
nations are currently upgrading their IPR for purely domestic rea-
sons."'53 Second, and more importantly, after the rebuff of Chile's
fast-track request, it remains difficult to assess the United States'
will to push forward on hemispheric trade deals.14 The United
States administration still has to convince the leaders of influential
industries who do not have an immediately clear stake in improved
IPR, such as agriculture and textiles, that the prospect of increased
competition would be offset by new trade opportunities for all
American industries. In a strategic sense, the developing nations
of the hemisphere rely on the authority of the President to over-
come protectionist lobbies in the Congress. 5 ' A weakened presi-
dency leaves doubt as to the resolve of America's trade leader-
ship. 15
C. TRIPs itself is an Evolutionary Step Towards a Yet
Unknown, but Implicitly Acknowledged, International
Standard
TRIPs is a revolutionary agreement, this no one disputes. It
was the first time that an international standard of intellectual
property was agreed upon by a majority of nations. Virtually no
country has avoided making some commitment to change to its
153. See Edge, supra note 90, at 202-04.
154. See Miguel Otero-Lathrop, MERCOSUR and NAFTA: The Need for Conver-
gence, 4-SUM NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 116, 120 (1998).
155. See id. at 121-22.
156. See David A. Gantz, The United States and The Expansion of Western Hemi-
sphere Free Trade: Participant or Observer?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381, 391-
405 (1997).
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IPR regime. J.H. Reichman and others wisely counsel that realiz-
ing practical gains from the textual advances of TRIPs will take far
more time and effort than many in the developed world expect.
5 7
Yet, TRIPs is not an ideal document. Much is unduly vague and
complex.'58 TRIPs' central accomplishment is that it acknowledges
that an international standard exists, rather than its definitive for-
mulation of such a standard.5 9
The content of TRIPs itself, can be described as defensive. Its
articles characterize the existing diversity of IPR regimes, round-
ing them up rather than down, then applies to this picture a "stand-
still" provision. The goal of TRIPs for American and European
negotiators was more to restrain developing countries from any
further erosion of IPR protection and less to revise IPR standards
substantially upwards.' 60
TRIPs left both issues of substance and language unresolved.
For instance, the major issues include what restrictions will be im-
posed on compulsory licensing, the scope of price controls, what to
do when patents expire in one country but not another, and how to
provide better enforcement at the border. 6' In addition, areas such
as the treatment of encrypted satellite signals, advanced biotech-
nology, and commercial data bases were left off the table because
of a lack of information or of consensus. 62 It is unclear what is
meant by terms such as "significant investment,"'' 63 "taking account
157. See Reichman, supra note 17, at 261-63.
158. See generally M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2: An Argument For Cau-
tion, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 381 (1997) (evaluating Article 27.2 of
the TRIPs Agreement).
159. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275,
279 (1997).
160. See Cheng, supra note 25, at 2013 n.30. TRIPs was intended to provide a
minimum of intellectual property rights. See id.
161. See Jeffrey A. Wolfson, Patent Flooding in the Japanese Patent Office: Meth-
ods For Reducing Patent Flooding and Obtaining Effective Patent Protection, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 531, 557-58 (1994).
162. See generally Harper, supra note 158. This piece provides just one example of
the subjects left open to argument and interpretation in TRIPs.
163. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, at 1224 (referring to "significant invest-
ment").
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of the legitimate interests of third parties" '64 and the limits on
remedies. 165 Other terms are sprinkled throughout the text, words
such as "substantially,"'' 66 "reasonably"' 67 and "legitimate," 16' all of
which invite misunderstanding. TRIPs cannot be considered as the
final word on an economically efficient and legally coherent global
IPR standard.
Both developed and developing countries stand to gain from a
prompt outlining of such an optimal global standard. For devel-
oping countries, the benefit lies in reducing uncertainty in domestic
policy 69 and ameliorating international commercial conflicts'70 cre-
ated by the constant flux in IPR obligations. The fact that different
countries have different capacities to implement such a standard
should not deter the effort to define it. It is possible that countries
may agree to a IPR standard that they simply do not have the in-
stitutional capacity to translate into reality. Yet, they should be
able to remove the most offending practices such as discriminatory
compulsory licenses.
Non-compliance on the basis of under-developed institutions is
in some sense preferable to non-compliance on the basis of unre-
formed legislation and regulation, though complete compliance
should remain the priority. The former is a matter of time, the lat-
ter a matter of political determination. By that I mean non-
compliance on the basis of institutional capacity is preferable to
active non-compliance because it shifts the emphasis to technical
issues'7' and away from competing visions of political economy.
Opinions differ, however, on how far you should let the cart get
ahead of the horse.
It would be a lost opportunity not to employ the FTAA as a
164. Id. at 1207 ("taking into account of the legitimate interests of third parties").
165. See id. at 1215 (referring to limiting remedies).
166. See id. at 1174 (referring to "substantially").
167. See id. at 1173, 1183 (referring to "reasonably").
168. See id. at 1170, 1197 (referring to "legitimate").
169. See generally Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of Na-
tional Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 769 (1997) (discussing intellectual property norms in international
trading agreements).
170. Id.
171. See Edge, supra note 90, at 202-04.
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means to further define an optimal global standard, not withstand-
ing the possibility of conflict. Any serious set of negotiations
needs some conflict to expose and define the interests at work, ul-
timately revealing possible compromises. At a bare minimum, the
FTAA should ensure no regression towards the notion of two sepa-
rate IPR standards, one for the developed world and one for the
developing world. To do so would impose the model of aboriginal
Indian reservations on international IPR law, superficially protec-
tive and ultimately debilitating.
D. The Origins of the FTAA in NAFTA Suggests a Similar or
Higher Standard of IPR Protection
More significant than TRIPs to the future of the FTAA nego-
tiations is the IPR chapter of the 1993 NAFTA treaty among the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.'- The FTAA, itself, came into
being as a possible successor to NAFTA. That was the rhetoric, at
least, of the thirty-four leaders who met in Miami in April 1994 to
declare their commitment to eliminate hemispheric tariffs by the
year 2005.' 3 Since then, the Mexican currency collapsed,1 4 Presi-
dent Clinton failed to secure "fast track" approval from the Con-
gress for Chile's entry into a NAFTA-like trade agreement, 7 5 and
strong critics of free trade on both the Left and Right have emerged
in virtually every country.1 6 Still NAFTA remains the model for
the FTAA.
Does that then mean that the IPR in the FTAA should resemble
the content and structure of NAFTA? The answer is Yes and no.
Yes in the sense that Canada, the United States, and Mexico would
have just cause to deny new signatories the complete tariff benefits
of an expanded NAFTA if they got to "cherry pick" which
NAFrA obligations they would adopt. NAFTA was signed as a
package deal and was only possible because of its all-or-nothing
172. See Jane Bussey, Optimism Amid Upheaval - Regional Woes Could Impact
Talks, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 1998, at IF.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
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structure of negotiations.' Each country weighed the trade-offs in
NAFTA, then signed the agreement because as a whole it prom-
ised a net benefit.
Yet every negotiation should have its own dynamic based on
an understanding of underlying commonly held principles. What
is important is some shared vision as to what IPR protection should
produce. Such a vision is not exclusively American, Canadian, or
Mexican.
It is also worth noting, as Robert M. Sherwood and Carlos A.
Primo Braga have, that a common base for a hemispheric IPR
agreement also lies in the intensification of the regional integration
accords ("RIAs"), such as MERCOSUR, the Group of Three Ac-
cord and Andean Common Market ("ANCOM") through which
IPR harmonization is already being addressed."'
E. If IPR are Going to be Strengthened in the Western
Hemisphere, Let's go Once not Twice to the Dentist,
Especially with a "Millennium" Round of Global Trade
Talks on the Horizon
1. The Trouble with the TRIPs Deadline
Though good reasons exist to proceed swiftly to the negotiation
and implementation of an IPR agreement in the FTAA, strong im-
pediments remain to prompt action. All countries have until 2005
to negotiate the FTAA. Some countries have until 2005 to imple-
ment TRIPs fully.'7 Countries, taking the line of least resistance,
could argue that if they have until 2005 to implement TRIPs, why
should they negotiate a whole new set of IPR obligations in the
FTAA. Such a position, however, could jeopardize the current op-
portunity to put the IPR issue to rest for the foreseeable future.
177. See Jane Bussey, Not Willing to Wait, Countries Lay their Own Fast Tracks,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 13, 1998 at 1H.
178. See Robert M. Sherwood & Carlos A. Primo Braga, Intellectual Property,
Trade and Economic Development: A Road Map for the FTAA Negotiations, in 21 THE
NORTH-SOuTH AGENDA PAPER, §§ 3-4 (North-South Center, University of Miami ed.,
1996).
179. See Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, In-
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 81, 107 (1994).
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An unusual feature of TRIPs was its comparatively long dead-
line for developing nations to implement the agreement. 80 Devel-
oping countries already in transition away from centralized eco-
nomic control may postpone some of their TRIPS obligations until
January 1, 2000.'" l Countries who did not have product patent
protection laws for advanced items such as pharmaceuticals at the
time of signing, have until 2005 to comply.88 The very least de-
veloped countries have until 2006 to raise their patent protection to
the TRIPS standard. 83 In contrast under NAFTA, Canada and the
United States had to give immediate force to the provisions on
January 1, 1993.184 Mexico had a grace period of up to three years
on some of its obligations.'85
Two reasons explain the extended implementation period in
TRIPs. It reflects, to a degree, the very uneven state of substantive
IPR law and enforcement mechanisms among countries. No one
would dispute that developing countries face difficult challenges in
bringing the law and the reality of intellectual property up to the
level of TRIPs. The possibility exists that the actual commitment
to strengthened IPR by some countries was marginal at best.
The long deadlines of TRIPs have likely tempted some current
government leaders to avoid dealing with the state of their coun-
try's IPR protections. Why bother when the deadlines create the
opportunity to pass the problem on to a potential successor. Who-
ever he or she is would be the one to face the political and eco-
nomic fallout which might accompany any upgrade of domestic
180. See id. at 107-08.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Canada had earlier taken remedial steps in the area of IPR. In preparation for
NAFTA and TRIPs (though NAFTA was implemented before TRIPs, the IP section was
negotiated after the general thrust of TRIPS was evident), Canada revised its patent law
with Bill C-91 in 1993. It extended a full twenty years of protection to all patents in-
cluding those held by brand-name pharmaceutical companies, thus ending its fifteen year
experiment with compulsory licensing.
185. By July 1994, Mexico's patent law was substantially upgraded and the Mexi-
can Industrial Property Institute ("MIPI") was created to monitor and enforce the law in-
cluding, upon request of private parties, the search and seizure of counterfeit goods. See
Edwin S. Flores Troy, The Development of Modem Frameworks for Patent Protection:
Mexico, A Model For Reform, 6TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 133, 146-151 (1998).
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IPR standards to the TRIPs level. It is relatively easy to agree to a
difficult policy that someone else will have to implement. The
deadlines also raise the possibility that successive governments,
having never signed the original agreement, may not consider
themselves bound to it to the same degree as the previous admini-
stration..
In Canada, it was a Progressive Conservative government un-
der Brian Mulroney who upgraded the patent laws in 1993 to pro-
vide for a full twenty year protection. 186 Four years later, Alan
Rock, the Attorney General of the new Liberal government, was
publicly speculating that the term of patent protection could be
shortened from twenty years.1
87
Long deadlines invite failure. In the absence of sensible dead-
lines, it is responsible to press for accelerated implementation. If
the FTAA negotiations on IPR can be fast-tracked, the nations of
the western hemisphere could reach a one-time agreement on IPR
standards and move on a single implementation schedule. If there
are two overlapping implementation schedules, first TRIPs, then
FTAA, it will lead to unnecessary friction. A one-shot implemen-
tation schedule is possible given the limited substantive differences
between TRIPS and NAFTA's Chapter Seventeen.'88
2. Millennium Round
The prospect of a "Millennium Round" of WTO talks should
give a special impetus to fast-tracked FTAA IPR negotiations with
a single short implementation schedule. The FTAA could prove
the testing ground for the "Millennium" IPR standard with the
western hemisphere countries pulling ahead of the rest of the world
by already having such a standard in place.
The European Community President, Leon Brittan, has already
issued the call for a "Millennium Round" of WTO talks. President
186. See Edward Greenspan & Anne Mclvoy, Rock gets ready to roll, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Jan. 19, 1998 at Al.
187.. See Bill McArthur, "Property Rights and The Pharmaceutical Industry," paper
presented at the The Canadian Property Rights Research Institute meeting, Calgary, Al-
berta, Mar. 21, 1998 available at <http://www.canprri.org>.
188. Compare TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, with NAFTA, supra note 37. The
differences are discussed in infra Part II.
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Clinton made a similar plea in his 1998 State of the Union Ad-
dress. Sundry scholars, politicians, and business people have sup-
ported this initiative. 8 9 If a "Millennium Round" begins, say in the
year 2000, two things are possible. First, the FTAA talks could
potentially be subsumed into it. Second, a TRIPs II will begin.
This is not to suggest that the FTAA could prove to be a waste
of time and effort. To the contrary, the FTAA could deliver a
NAFTA-level of IPR protection that would serve as a world stan-
dard. In addition, with an accelerated implementation schedule,
the FTAA nations could, in one shot, reach their TRIPs, FTAA and
future TRIPs II obligations. If that is achieved, the issue of IPR
could take a long-deserved breather from both the international
agenda and the domestic agenda of developing nations.
At any rate, even if the "millennium" round absorbs the FTAA,
the FTAA will have proven beneficial as a training exercise for
both the developing and developed countries of the hemisphere.
For developing countries in South America, the FTAA provides an
excellent capacity building exercise.190 They are learning how to
handle multilateral trade negotiations of almost incredible com-
plexity more aggressively and effectively.' 9' In part, this new
found confidence is the result of the smaller scale and tighter focus
of a regional negotiation. The developing countries also have the
opportunity to re-affirm among themselves the growing Latin
American consensus regarding what stimulates economic growth
and the role of government in its achievement. 92"
For the United States, the FTAA provides lessons in both do-
mestic and international trade politics. For one, international trade
leadership depends upon first securing domestic support for the ba-
sic goals sought. While the FTAA negotiations can and will go
ahead in the absence of the "touchstone" of United States approval
189. See generally, WTO's Ruggiero Says New Trade Round Possible at Turn of
Century, AFX NEWS, May 26, 1998 (revealing support for a new trade round).
190. See generally, Heather Scoffield, Turmoil Hinders Trade Agenda, GLOBE &
MAIL, Sept. 21, 1998, at B1 (examining the circumstances that hinder trade agenda).
191. See id.
192. For a brief introduction to this new consensus, see PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS &
KAREN LAFOLLETTE ARAUJO, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA (Oxford
Univ. Press 1997).
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for "fast track" negotiations with Chile, America's resolve for tar-
iff reduction is being questioned.' 93 In the context of the FTAA
IPR negotiations, key concessions will not be made until that re-
solve is clarified.
Whether IPR is addressed in the FTAA or in a TRIPs II during
a "Millennium Round," it will be addressed. The nations which
have developed the capacity to negotiate the minutiae of IPR will
have the best opportunity to assert their various interests.
II. IF HIGHER THAN TRIPs PROTECTION SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED
IN THE FTAA, WHAT SHOULD5 BE THE LEVEL AND SCOPE?
NAFTA's Chapter Seventeen on IPR compels not only the dis-
cussion of IPR in the FTAA, but also in large part determines its
content. That should not prove unduly burdensome because the
NAFTA IPR provisions are not so dramatically different than
TRIPs provides.
Chapter Seventeen closely follows that of the TRIPs negotiat-
ing text brought to the table in 1991 by Arthur Dunkel.' 94 The
compromise text ultimately adopted in TRIPS in its scope did not
differ substantially from the Dunkel draft. 95 TRIPs differs from
the Dunkel Draft mostly in its continuation of the numerous ex-
ception to national treatment obligations contained in the Paris 96and 197 .. 198
and Bere'rn Conventions.. In contrast, NAFITA only allows for a
few, precisely detailed, exemptions from national treatment obli-
gations.' 99
193. See Scoffield, supra note 190.
194. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, GATI Doc. No. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter
Dunkel Draft].
195. Compare Dunkel Draft, supra note 194 with TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5.
The most substantial difference in scope between TRIPs and the Dunkel draft deals with
performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters for whom national treatment only
applies to rights specified in TRIPs itself.
196. See Paris Convention, supra note 134.
197. See Berne Convention, supra note 134.
198. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 3(1) & 3(2); see also Alexander A.
Caviedes, International Copyright Law: Should The European Union Dictate Its Devel-
opment?, 16 B.U. INT'LL.J. 165, 192-94 (1998).
199. See Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property under NAFTA,
Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN-U.S.
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The best known national treatment exemption in NAFTA is for
Canada's cultural industries.2°° It is a suspect exemption.0 1 Cana-
dian commentators have shown repeatedly that the policy owes lit-
tle to any nuanced or profound understanding of culture, Canadian
or otherwise.0 2 The absurdity of it all can be seen in the aftermath
of the WTO ruling against the Canadian penalties levied on split-
run magazines.2 3 The government now proposes to restrict Cana-
dian companies from advertising in American magazines sold in
Canada.204 At the same time, Canadian magazines which are sold
in the United States, albeit in small numbers, are actively seeking
advertising from American companies.0 5 At the time of this writ-
ing, a pointless trade war remains a possibility. Both countries
would lose by any economic or diplomatic yardstick.
NAFTA represents a landmark treaty both in its detailed de-
L.J. 261, 281-282 (1997) ("NAFTA ... establishes a sweeping national treatment re-
quirement[ ] which, [is] subject to a few specific exceptions .... ). For example, with
respect to secondary use of sound recordings such as broadcasting or other public com-
munication, NAFTA, art. 1703(1) states that a Party may limit the rights of another
Party's performers to those rights its nationals are accorded in the territory of such other
Party. See NAFTA, supra note 37, at 671, art. 1703.
200. See NAFTA, supra note 37, at 702, art.2106. The article refers to annex 2106,
which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between the United
States and Canada, any measure adopted or maintained with respect to cultural
industries, except as, specifically provided in Article 302 (Market Access-
Tariff Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in
response, shall be governed exclusively in accordance with the terms of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and obligations be-
tween Canada and any other Party with respect to such measures shall be iden-
tical to those applying between Canada and the United States.
Id.
201. See generally Theresa A. Larrea, Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption
From NAFTA, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107 (1997) (arguing against the cultural indus-
tries exemption); Hale E. Hedley, Canadian Cultural Policy and the NAFTA: Problems
Facing The U.S. Copyright Industries, 28 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 655
(1995)(discussing the effect of Canadian cultural policy on United States copyright in-
dustries).
202. See WILLIAM T. STANBURY, CANADIAN CONTENT REGULATIONS: THE
INTRUSIVE STATE AT WORK (Fraser Inst. 1998).
203. See Peter Morton, Ottawa Loads? Another Round in Magazine Wars, THE
FINANCIAL POST, July 25, 1998, at 1 (discussing the aftermath of the WTO ruling).
204. See John Urquhart, Canada Seeks to Protect Its Magazines From Losing Ad
Revenue to Foreigners, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1998, at B12.
205. See id.
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scription of IPR obligations and various dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. Chapter Seventeen has four parts.2 °6 First, it sets forth gen-
eral provisions on existing IP conventions, national treatment, and
anti-competitive practices. °7 Second, it defines obligations re-
garding IP standards in the areas of copyrights, patents, trade se-
crets and industrial designs across a number of industries.0 8 Third,
it introduces obligations regarding enforcement measures, includ-
ing access to civil courts, judicial review and interim injunctions,
and requires that these do not become barriers to legitimate trade.2°
Fourth, it contains miscellaneous provisions, such as technical co-
210
operation.
As noted, NAFTA, excluding the exceptions to national treat-
ment, closely resembles TRIPs.21 One commentator notes, "The
intellectual property provisions of the NAFTA were designed with
the pending TRIPs agreement in mind. In most aspects TRIPS af-
fords roughly the same protection for intellectual property as does
the NAFTA.,, 2" Robert M. Sherwood and Carlos A. Primo Braga
have detailed the list of NAFTA provisions which exceed the pro-
tections in TRIPs. 13
As these issues are generally resolved in NAFTA, the FTAA
IPR negotiations should move on to tackle thornier issues.
206. See NAFTA, supra note 37, at 670-681, ch. 17.
207. See id. at 670-671, arts. 1701-1704.
208. See id. at 671-676, arts. 1705-1713.
209. See id. at 676-679, arts. 1714-1718.
210. See id. at 679, art. 1719.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See Schott, supra note 140, at 122.
213. Sherwood and Braga offer that:
[M]ore precise and comprehensive treaty adherence requirements including
UPOV adherence for new plant varieties, a more positive statement of national
treatment, highly constrained transition periods, protection of encrypted satel-
lite signals, narrower controls on abusive conditions, enhanced protection for
software, databases, and sound recordings, enhanced contractual rights in copy-
right, tighter language regarding rental rights, extended minimum trademark
terms, broader definition of the relevant public in determining whether trade-
marks are well known, tighter compulsory licensing constraints, disallowance
of dependent patents, 'pipeline' protection, and reversal of the burden of proof
for process patents. The treatment of patent exhaustion, sometimes called par-
allel imports, is not entirely clear cut but appears to be constrained.
Sherwood & Braga, supra note 178, §§ 3-4.
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Sherwood and Braga identify a few key "tough issues" which the
FTAA IPR negotiations could address.1 4  These issues include
Compulsory Licensing, Cultural Exemptions, "Pipeline" protec-
tions, Higher Life Forms, New Plant Varieties, Information Net-
work Systems, Trade Secrets, Geographical Exhaustion of Rights,
and a Hemispheric Intellectual Property Council."5 If these issues
were addressed, the possibility exists of devising not just a TRIPs
Plus, but a NAFTA Plus agreement which could set the interna-
tional standard for much of the next century.
Issues most in need of further resolution include the compen-
sation mechanism for compulsory licensing and the definition of
culture exemptions. In the complex area of pharmaceutical and
life sciences patents, there are a number of specific issues to ad-
dress. 6 These include guidelines for determining the trade in
goods for which the patents has expired in one country, but not an-
other. Another issue, albeit for the more developed countries in
the hemisphere, is that of patent term restoration which allows
companies to enjoy the full term of their patent protection by add-
ing the time spent securing regulatory approval on to the life of the
patent."' There are issues as to infringement exceptions for regu-
latory approval and for allowing generic competitors to stockpile
products for release the moment the patent expires. 8
A particularly controversial and important issue is that of data
package protection .2 9 This refers to the capability of companies to
keep the data they submitted in order to receive regulatory ap-
proval exclusive for a longer period of time.22 Access to data such
as the results of human trials gives generic manufacturers a head
214. See id.
215. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under a Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas: The Shape of Things to Come, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 597 (1997) [herein-
after Lopez I] (examining dispute resolution methods in the free trade area).
216. See infra notes 217-218.
217. See WaxmanlHatch Act has not "lived up to its promise," PhRMA's Bantham
Maintains, THE PINK SHEET, Mar. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16952088.
218. See One Year Later, Canadian Patent Laws to Stay About the Same,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Feb. 16,1998, available in 1998 WL 8765022.
219. See Brian D. Coggio & Frances D. Cerrito, Immunity for the Drug Approval
Process, No Patent Infringement Under Certain Circumstances, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1998,
at S4.
220. See id.
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start on preparing a product for market. Another contentious area
is that of "linkage regulations," which allows patent holders to
seek court orders to prevent the sale of a drug which appears to
violate their patents.2 '
On the assumption that the highest standards of IPR protection
could prove the most economically efficient, the FTAA negotia-
tions should seek to achieve a level of IPR consistent with the
protections offered in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Ja-
pan.
Ill. WHAT SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS SHOULD THE
FTAA ADOPT TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION?
The question of the type of enforcement mechanism to negoti-
ate into the FTAA has a slight air of unreality given the diverse
quality of legal institutions among the participating countries. A
country's ability to enforce IPR standards cannot be separated
from its ability to enforce any law. The options are basically three-
fold: adopt one of the existing multilateral models such as those in
MERCOSUR, NAFTA, or the WTO; start from scratch and build a
new enforcement mechanism; or modify elements of existing mod-
els to best fit the circumstances."2 Whatever the choice, countries
will also have to give consideration to the interaction between the
three identified existing mechanisms and other more specialized
mechanisms such as investment protection treaties, including the
stalled Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") and the
"non-violation complaint alleging nullification or impairment of
benefits."2 3
The first place to start is to suggest what should be the guiding
principles. A discussion of guiding principles should address the
following issues: legality versus informality, exclusively State to
State actions versus a mixture of state and private rights of action,
domestic versus bilateral or multilateral panels, confidentiality ver-
221. See generally Canada's Linkage System "Is Unfair," MARKETLETTER, July 6,
1998, available in 1998 WL 11623102 (discussing Canada's linkage system).
222. See Lopez I, supra note 215, at 624.
223. Eric M. Burt, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on
Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1015, §§ III, IV.A.2 (1997) (discussing MAI's).
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sus openness, compensation versus removal of trade benefits, and
permanent versus ad hoc enforcement institutions.
A. Guiding Principles for Intellectual Property Protection
1. Legality versus Informality
The NAFTA dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms
are highly legalistic, depending upon rules which emerge through
carefully detailed procedures, rather than the "merits of the
case." '224 Over time, one expects the procedures laid out in Chapter
Twenty to become more precise. 25 This trend has a value in pro-
moting transparency and certainty.
Given the diversity of legal institutions and legal cultures
within the hemisphere, there is much merit in devising enforce-
ment mechanisms which allow numerous opportunities for infor-
mal, negotiated solutions before disputes reach the stage of a
binding panel ruling. 6 This entails recognition of the enforcement
mechanisms employed in MERCOSUR, which rely upon informal
political negotiations often at a very high level.227 The downsides
are the politicization of trade disputes in which the scarce time of
executives can be wasted on relatively minor issues. Still, it is
preferable to have negotiated rather than imposed enforcement. As
countries become more accustomed to using international mecha-
nisms, more legalistic forms could evolve.
The question becomes: "Can the model of the NAFTA dispute
resolution and enforcement mechanisms be sufficiently modified
to allow for opportunities for informality without sacrificing core
transparency and certainty?" Company law provides some sugges-
tions. For instance, there could be a defined period during which
participants in a dispute could "opt out" of the dispute resolution
224. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experience, 32 TEx. IT'L L.J. 163, 165, 207 (1997) [hereinafter Lopez II].
225. See id. at 208.
226. See generally Lopez II, supra note 224 (examining dispute resolution under
NAFTA).
227. See Cherie 0. Taylor, Dispute Resolution As A Catalyst For Economic Inte-
gration And An Agent For Deepening Integration: NAFTA AND MERCOSUR?, 17 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 853 (1996-1997) (addressing dispute resolution in Section II).
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process to pursue informal settlement. If an accommodation could
not be reached, the more formal rules would be triggered as a de-
fault.
The goal is to avoid unnecessary confrontations at times when
countries are simply in a state too chaotic to comply. The example
that springs to mind is the WTO rulings against India for its failure
to pass complying legislation during a time of political crisis in
1995.228
2. Mixture of State and Private Actions versus Solely
State Actions
A mixture of state and private rights of action, as exists in
NAFTA, provides a greater scope and flexibility for dispute reso-
lution.2 9  State-to-state mechanisms tend to be complex and
lengthy. They impose costs that may come close to exceeding the
value of issue under dispute. Private/State dispute resolution pro-
cedures have the advantage of more closely mirroring the more
familiar domestic court processes which allow for negotiated set-
tlements at various points. 3° They also have the benefit of remov-
ing a great deal of the politics found in relatively minor disputes.
231
The most important point here is that alleged violations of IPR
almost always involve private companies.232 To the extent that
governments are taking up the cause of these companies, their ex-
penditures represent a subsidy. While clearly governments have a
role in protecting the interests of domestic companies in foreign
228. See Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
229. See NAFTA, supra note 37, at 682, ch. 19; see also G. Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 834-39, 887 (1995).
230. See Shell, supra note 229, at 889-890.
231. Id. at 837 (noting the desirability of removal of government influence from the
realm of international trade); see generally Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access:
A Comparison of the NAFTA and the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1
(1998) (comparing NAFTA and European Union disciplines).
232. See Daniel F. Perez, Exploitation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 10 COMPUTER LAWYER 10 (1993). A recent estimate by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission indicates that United States companies are incurring $40 to
$60 billion per year due to violations of intellectual property rights.
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markets, the costs should fall more on companies themselves.
3. Domestic versus Bilateral and Multilateral Resolution
In an ideal world, intellectual property disputes would be han-
dled in the country where the alleged violations took place. One
can too easily get trapped in the scholastic intricacies of these in-
ternational dispute settlement mechanisms and forget that the vast
majority of IPR disputes are settled within countries themselves,
and rightly so.233 It is the quality of domestic enforcement mecha-
nisms which will best determine the effectiveness of any interna-
tional IPR standards. Still the ideal supposes a lot, such as rea-
sonably consistent domestic laws and well-functioning legal
institutions.
On this count, the multilateral enforcement provided by TRIPs
is problematic.3 Despite detailed provisions outlining enforce-
ment procedures, TRIPs includes a significant "escape clause."
Paragraph 5 of Article 41 states that Part III, laying out the en-
forcement requirements:
[D]oes not create any obligation to put in place a judicial
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights
distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor
does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law
in General. Nothing in this part creates any obligation with
respect of the distribution of resources as between the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights and the enforce-
ment of law in general.235
The clause admits that if a country's judicial system does not
work very well, intellectual .property disputes have no special
claim to any better treatment than other disputes similarly caught
233. See China: Courts Handle More IPR Lawsuits (China: Business Information
Network, July 17, 1997).
234. See Kuo & Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 539. TRIPs did provide the signifi-
cant advance of placing IPR disputes within the ambit of WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures. What must be noted here is the improvement of the new WTO procedures over
the older GATr procedures. Specifically the new WTO procedures curtail the ability of
defendant WTO members to block the adoption of VT0 panel reports and to drag out
decisions indefinitely. See id.
235. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, at 1197.'
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in the morass of under-performing courts.236 It would be narrow-
minded to suggest that IPR disputes should have better treatment.
The better course would be to say that the inevitability of increas-
ing numbers of IPR disputes provides one more reason for nations
to upgrade their judicial systems.
Attention to IPR in discussing judicial reform has a number of
advantages. Bluntly put, as IPR disputes often involve great
amounts of money, they attract attention.237 Such attention may be
necessary to jump start the hemispheric process of judicial reform.
It is time to break out of the mold of hollow and formalistic initia-
tives which have yet to produce substantive changes. As Rick
Messick of the World Bank notes that "[iun the past five years or
so the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank
have either approved or initiated loans totaling over $300 million
for judicial reform projects in some [twenty-five] countries ....
More importantly, a focus on IPR as property rights can bring
to the foreground fundamental rights and "rule of law" issues.239
The reform of IPR enforcement in domestic judicial systems would
contribute to increasing the contractual efficiency identified earlier
as a key to economic growth.
236. See id.
237. See Perez, supra note 232, at 10.
238. Richard Messick, Judicial Reform: A Survey of the Issues, in WORLD BANK
INTERNAL WORKING PAPERS(1997). Messick continues:
New courts have been created, the number of judges increased, and computers
and other modem technologies introduced. The codes controlling civil and
criminal procedures have been streamlined, and the judicial sector has been re-
organized to make it more independent. But, despite these changes, many sys-
tems still perform poorly.
Id.
239. See generally Laurence R. Helter, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy 39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
357 (1998) (offering a proposal that would deepen the rights nature of IPRs).
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4. Confidentiality versus Openness
William Landes and Richard Posner have argued that the
courts in supplying judgments create a "public good."2" The work
of mediation and arbitration panels in defining and interpreting the
underlying text of trade agreements provides an analogous service.
The value of that information, however, is only as good as its dis-
semination. 4'
Information about court and panel decisions does more than
just guide behavior and transactions; it is also a means to hold
judges and tribunal members accountable. Jeremy Bentham once
wrote:
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every
shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has
place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice
operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.
Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to
exertion and sheerest of all guards against improbity. It
keeps the judge himself while trying under trial. The secu-
rity of securities is publicity.4
The issue of openness has arisen between the United States and
Canada involving disputes both in NAFTA and the WTO.14' Two
United States companies have recently challenged Canadian policy
under NAFTA's Chapter Eleven on investments.244 The hearings
were held in strict secrecy. The Canadian Trade Minister, Sergio
240. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Pri-
vate Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (arguing that the courts in supplying judgments
create a "public good).
241. See Panel Discussion, Transnational Litigation: International Arbitration and
Alternatives, Opportunities and Pitfalls, 10 AUT INT'L L. PRACTICUM 74, 84 (1997).
242. GERALD GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 51 (4th ed. Carswell 1995).
243. See generally Scott Morrison & Edward Alden, Ottawa Faces Claim Over
PCB Waste Ban, FIN. TIMES LTD. (London), Sept. 2, 1998, at 4 (detailing dispute); see
also, J.-G. Castel, Q.C. & C.M. Gastle, Deep Economic Integration Between Canada and
the United States, the Emergence of Strategic Innovation Policy and the Need for Trade
Law Reform, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1998).
244. See NAFTA Secrecy, TORONTO STAR LTD., Aug. 27, 1998, at A27.
245. See Why The Secrecy Over Investors' Rights?, FIN. POST LTD., Aug. 29, 1998,
at sec. 1, 20.
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Marchi, defended the secrecy as necessary to preserve commercial
confidentiality. 24 He adopted a similar stance in response to a re-
quest from the United States Trade Representative, Charlene
Barshefsky, to open up to the media the hearings of WTO dispute
settlement panel addressing the issue of Canadian dairy exports. 7
As a Toronto Globe and Mail editorial correctly pointed out,
"those are our tax dollars at stake and our laws that are on the
stand. We have the right to learn the case against us.
48
5. Compensation versus Removal of Trade Benefits
The penalties for violations of trade agreements boil down to
two elements: (1) compensating the offended company or country
or (2) removing the offender's trade benefits in the specific product
area or in other areas as well, for example, cross retaliation.
Though both NAFTA and TRIPs have adopted cross-retaliation,
this is probably not a healthy trend. 49 Negotiating compensation
provides a more economically efficient solution.2 0 First it forces a
country to deal squarely with the costs of its discriminatory be-
havior. Political leaders will have to publicly defend why they are
using taxpayer dollars to defend the commercial advantages of
certain industries. Second, it does not weaken the hard-fought ad-
vances in free trade. Third, it provides greater scope for variations
in domestic policy as long as costs are acknowledged and compen-
sated. At any rate, negotiations on potential compensation should
come before the suspension of trade benefits. In the event that
countries cannot agree on compensation, there still remains the al-
ternative punishment of canceling trade preferences.
Particularly in the area of IPR, compensation provides an at-
246. See NAFTA Secrecy, supra note 244, at A27.
247. See Settle Trade Disputes In The Open, FIN. POST LTD., Sept. 11, 1998, § 1, at
10.
248. "Can We Talk," GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 10, 1998, at A24.
249. It must also be noted that with IPR disputes subject to WTO jurisdiction,
WIPO dispute settlement mechanisms are left in a weakened position because of their far
weaker powers to compel resolution and to impose penalties. This must be interpreted as
practically mooting the WIPO's promotion of the Draft Treaty on the Settlement of Dis-
putes Between States in the Field of Intellectual Property.
250. For a discussion of efficiency costs of negotiation over legal rules, see BRIAN
R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 25 (1997).
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tractive option. The nature of some knowledge-intensive products,
such as pharmaceutical drugs, allows for a fairly reliable estimate
of lost profits. For instance, if a domestic drug manufacturer vio-
lates a MNE's patent by selling copies of a drug, it is reasonably
easy to uncover its sales records. In the case of a large number of
enterprises copying records and films, though, it is not as straight-
forward an exercise.
The FTAA negotiators have the opportunity to bring compen-
sation into the forefront of IPR dispute resolution. This could
serve the purpose of resolving related disputes such as the scope of
cultural exemptions.
6. Permanent versus Ad Hoc Enforcement Institutions
If the goal is to negotiate most disputes and, to an extent, ne-
gotiate enforcement, it is counter-productive to establish expensive
permanent tribunals who will inevitably have an incentive to drum
up cases and drag them out. NAFTA and the WTO cope well
enough with ad hoc panels."' Moreover, as David Lopez suggests
in arguing for evolutionary enforcement norms and procedure in
the FTAA, a permanent institution is much more prone not to keep
up with changingattitudes and capacities."'
B. A Modified NAFTA Enforcement Mechanism Should
Provide the FTAA Starting Point
Given the diversity of countries in the hemisphere, simply
adopting the WTO or NAFTA enforcement procedures would cre-
ate too legalistic a mechanism to be immediately practical. As a
result expediency gives reason to incorporate some informal nego-
251. See, e.g., John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, U.S. Prevails Before WTO
Panel in Dispute Over Argentina's Ad Valorem Import Tax and Duties, 4 INT'L LAW
UPDATE No 1, Jan. 1998 (detailing United States' victory); see also John R. Schmertz, Jr.
& Mike Meier, WTO Holds in Favor.of U.S. in Trade Dispute with India Over Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 3 INT'L LAW UPDATE No 10 (Oct. 1997); John R. Schmertz, Jr. &
Mike Meier, Before Dispute Settlement Panel of WTO, U.S. Prevails Over Canada Re-
garding Its Imposition of Discriminatory Taxes and Postal Rates on US Magazine Im-
ports, 3 INT'L LAW UPDATE No. 4 (Apr. 1997).
252. See Lopez II supra note 224, at 208 (discussing dispute settlement in trade dis-
putes of environmental and labor agreements.)
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tiation avenues contained in MERCOSUR.2 3 The basic framework
provided by NAFTA, progressive stages ending in compulsory
third-party arbitration for both State/State and Private/State dis-
putes with a final ruling that can require a schedule of compliance,
should be used as the starting point. As Boris Kozolchyk writes,
"[iun my opinion, NAFTA's model, and not that of supra-national
federalism is more likely to become universally acceptable. In the
grand scheme of international cooperative forces, NAFTA is the
model most consistent with the nature of the modem nation state
and with the limits of man's cooperative impulses. 254
The starting point should be NAFTA, but with modifications.
The modifications should seek to incorporate more openness, more
openings for negotiation, and more opportunities for compensa-
tion-based remedies. The FTAA should also include a forward-
looking statement as to the ultimate goal of resolving the majority
of IPR disputes through domestic courts rather than through the
ultra-national mechanisms provided for in trade agreements. Mul-
tilateral agency trade remedies should be extraordinary remedies.
International trade agreements can only provide a limited substitute
for the domestic entrenchment of the "rule of law."
C. Two Complications with the NAFTA Model
Though the NAFTA dispute resolution and enforcement
mechanisms could provide a starting point for the FTAA negotia-
tions, they also possess some complex and problematic features,
specifically the investment dispute resolution mechanism255 and the
non-violation complaint. 6
253. See Why All the MERCOSUR Excitement?, 4 MKT. LATIN AMER. No. 9 (Sept.
1, 1996).
254. See Lopez I, supra note 215, at 600 (quoting Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA In The
Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMPETITION L., 135, 144
(1996)).
255. See JAMES H. CARTER, LITIGATING IN FOREIGN TERRITORY: ARBITRATION
ALTERNATIVES AND ENFORCEMENT 19-26 (A.B.A. Center for Continuing Legal Educa-
tion, A.B.A. 1998).
256. See Hertz, supra note 199, at 262.
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1. Investment Protections
The FTAA presents the opportunity to make more explicit the
connection in NAFTA between IPR and investment obligations. 7
The importance of doing so lies in the fact that the investment
flows among the countries of the hemisphere may already exceed
in dollar terms the volume of trade.
A landmark achievement of NAIFTA was its Chapter Eleven on
investment protection. 5 Indeed, Allen Z. Hertz writes that "As for
NAFTA, none of its multiple personalities is more important than
its character as a powerful investment protection instrument." 259
Still, it is little understood that Chapter Eleven treats IPR as "in-
tangible property" and, therefore, falling under the definition of
"investment." 26° By having IPR covered by Chapter Eleven, in-
vestors are afforded a new avenue of enforcement. According to
Hertz, a former Canadian trade negotiator, in the case of an Inves-
tor/State dispute over a case of compulsory licensing, NAFTA
provides that the merits of dispute would be heard by a Chapter
Seventeen arbitration panel, but that the compensation to be paid in
the case of a violation might be determined separately by a Chapter
Eleven arbitration panel.26'
As with any new wrinkle, NAFTA's linkage of IPR and in-
vestment has raised a number of difficult issues. These include:
(1) what is the precise interaction between the trade and investment
chapters, (2) what definitions should prevail in the case that Most
Favored Nation ("MFN") status and "National Treatment" differs
between sections, (3) what is the precise scope of the investment
chapter's meaning of "expropriation" and, more importantly,
"measures tantamount to expropriation," (4) how do the invest-
ment provisions in NAFTA affect other investment and IPR trea-
ties, and (5) what affect do the investment provisions have on the
possibility of compensation to be paid in trade areas where exemp-
257. See Greater IP Protection Sought Within the FTAA, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 24,
27 (1997).
258. See Hertz, supra note 199, at 262.
259. See id. at 295 (citation omitted).
260. Id.
261. Telephone interview with Allen Z. Hertz, former Canadian Trade Negotiator,
Ottawa, Ontario (Aug. 10, 1998).
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tions have been negotiated, such as Canada's cultural industries?2 62
If the FTAA process can help to bring some of these very diffi-
cult issues closer to resolution, then it will have achieved a, great
deal. Protection for intellectual property as investments will likely
emerge in the next century as the preferred means to enforce rights.
And, so it should.
It can be asked what benefit, aside from building negotiating
knowledge and skills, Would developing nations gain from wading
through issues generated by NAFTA and left largely unresolved.
For one, success in the FTAA could push the WTO to take over the
MAI, a possibility made ever possible by the failure of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") to
advance talks beyond the short-sighted efforts of the French and
Canadian governments to restrict American 'cultural' industries.263
Through the FTAA process, the developing nations of the Ameri-
cas would prove that negotiating investment agreements does not,
and should not, have to remain a rich nation's game. If'the MAI is
negotiated within the WTO, developing nations will gain a say,
rather than face the option of agreeing or not agreeing to a text
written by the twenty nine OECD nations who albeit control ninety
eight percent of international FDI. 64 Indeed, the FTAA text could
well serve as the basis for the MAI text.
2. Non-violation Complaints
The FTAA negotiations may also address some of the ambi-
guities of an emerging enforcement mechanism, the non-violation
complaint. Allen Z. Hertz has described why this may be neces-
sary, stating "the non-violation complaint alleging nullification or
impairment of benefits, first fully elaborated under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947)... [is] now incor-
porated in both NAFTA and the WTO Understanding on Rules and
262. See Hertz, supra note 199, at 295-307.
263. See generally, A Survey of MERCOSUR, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996 available
in 1996 WL 11247186 (surveying MERCOSUR).
264. See Does the WTO Need Special, Rules for Foreign Direct Investment?,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 10; see also, All Free Traders Now?, EONOMIST, Dec. 7,
1996, at 25, available in 1996 WL 11247482.
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Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes." '65 There may
be no avoiding dealing with the issue.
The non-violation nullification or impairment complaint refers
to a right of action in a situation in which no explicit inconsistency
or breach of obligations has occurred, but the plaintiff party asserts
that an action by the defendant has upset the balance of conces-
sions and benefits expected when the original trade agreement was
signed. 66 In short, one party complains that even though no rule
was broken, they are not receiving the benefits which enticed them
to sign the agreement in the first place. As no inconsistency or
breach has occurred, the plaintiff cannot request that the defendant
remove the offending measure.2 67 Instead, through a WTO panel,
the plaintiff seeks compensation in order to restore the original
trade-off of benefits and concessions.2 68
The non-violation process presents a powerful tool for both
nations and private parties to enforce IPR against the constantly
novel ways to circumvent them. It does stress compensation over
removal of trade benefits. However, if not properly defined, the
non-violation complaint could lead to abuses for which the blame
would fall incorrectly on the standard of IPR protection rather than
the vagaries of the enforcement mechanism.
NAFTA applies the non-violation complaint to Chapter Sev-
enteen on intellectual property.2 69 Though there are exceptions, a
party could access NAFTA's State\State dispute settlement
mechanism in order to determine whether another party had initi-
ated a novel measure which, while not inconsistent with NAFTA,
nullified or impaired a benefit expected under Chapter Seventeen.
Potential actions that could trigger a non-violation complaint in-
clude new laws on cigarette packaging, domestic content in broad-
casting, and reference-based pricing for pharmaceutical drugs. 7°
265. See Hertz, supra note 199, at 262.
266. See id. at 285-86.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. See Linda E. Prudhomme, The Margarita War: Does the Popular Mixed Drink
"Margarita" Qualify as Intellectual Property?, 4 Sw. U.J.L. & TRADE Am. 109, 133
(1997).
270. See Hertz, supra note 199, at 292.
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Canada agreed to having non-violation complaints apply to IPR
out of the belief that it had secured sufficient exemptions, in par-
ticular cultural industries, to sufficiently reduce the risk that they
would ever be invoked."' Time and self-interest, of course, prove
remarkable inspirations for innovation.
That Canada agreed to have the non-violation complaint in
NAFTA surprised observers because it had opposed the American
effort to place it in TRIPs.272 A compromise position was only
found in the dying days of the TRIPs negotiations.2 73 It allowed
that non-violation complaints could not be initiated before January
1, 2000.274 The TRIPs Council is now examining recommendations
for using the non-violation complaint which will be sent to the
WTO Ministerial Conference who can either approve its use or or-
der more study.275 If the WTO ministers cannot reach a consensus,
then the non-violation complaint will apply to TRIPs disputes on
January 1, 2000.276
One challenge for the FTAA negotiators is to define what con-
stitutes a "benefit" which a non-violation complaint alleges has
been lost.2 77 If the definition of "benefits" is too narrow, then the
non-violation complaint procedure would not be effective. If it is
too broad, then the danger exists that any government action could
trigger an attempt to secure those benefits through legal means less
risky than the vicissitudes of the market. Some definition of
"benefit" must exist which 'allows IPR-holders to use fion-violation
complaints to protect their market opportunities, but does not at the
same time invite speculative litigation. Finally, there must be
some scope for government legislation and regulation that does not
trigger trade actions. Without a workable and sensible definition
of "benefits," whether by the FTAA, TRIPs, or the WTO, the exer-
cise of the non-violation complaints could provoke an undeserved
backlash against high standards of IPR. The accusation would be
271. See id. at 287.
272. See id. at 287-88.
273. See id. at 287.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 294.
[Vol.9:241
1998] STRENGTHENING IP RIGHTS THROUGH THE FTAA 299
that such standards had led to an unintended loss of sovereignty.
Frankly, whether the FTAA can competently deal with the non-
violation complaint issue remains a question.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to answer three questions. The answers
to each can be summarized as follows. First, the FTAA should ne-
gotiate a higher than TRIPS level of IPR protection. Both devel-
oped and developing nations will benefit from the resulting further
entrenchment of property rights, the expansion of free trade, the
shaping of a global optimal standard, and the settling of the intel-
lectual property debate at least in the short-term.
Second, the IPR protections in NAFTA provide the starting
point for the FTAA IPR negotiations. Negotiators should then go
further to address the tough issues including patent term restoration
and data exclusivity. Even though some technologies, such as
biotechnology and commercial databases, and some issues, such as
compensation for compulsory licensing, may not yield a consen-
sus, the effort to reach one will build knowledge and skills among
negotiators and clarify the conflicting interests.
Lastly, the enforcement mechanism for IPR contained in the
FTAA should start with the basic model of NAFTA and should in-
corporate features from MERCOSUR through the use of "default
rules" to provide for more openness, opportunities for negotiation
and the use of compensation rather than removal of trade benefits.
The FTAA should proceed to define investment protections and
non-violation complaints. More optimistically, the FTAA should
provide an impetus to the reform of domestic judicial and admin-
istrative institutions to minimize the need to resort to ultra-national
procedures.
To the first question, then, one may ask whether the FTAA is
being used by American trade negotiators, acting largely for the
benefit of the American pharmaceutical, software and entertain-
ment industries, to advance in a more manageable regional forum
those IPR standards which they failed to secure in TRIPs and to
negotiate an accelerated implementation of TRIPs and possibly a
TRIPs Plus in key hemispheric markets? The answer is: yes, but
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developing countries will gain considerable benefits in new trade
and investment opportunities.
Though self-interest may drive the American position on IPR,
there is no harm if the result increases economic efficiency through
the clearer definition and stronger enforcement of property rights.
The harms alleged to higher IPR standards are now being shown to
be, for the most part, either theoretical or short-term transition
problems. An empirical record is accumulating which shows
more clearly the benefits when developing countries adopt higher
IPR standards. Ultimately, property rights draw a line between
who allocates scarce resources, the state or the individual, in a
competitive market. The heavier the line is drawn, the greater the
restraint upon state opportunism and favoritism. The more clearly
the line is recognized, the greater the ability of the individual to
pursue the economic opportunities borne out of their own labor,
talent and invention.
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